

10-17-00

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**UTILITY PATENT APPLICATION TRANSMITTAL**  
**(Only for new nonprovisional applications under 37 CFR 1.53(b))**

Docket No. : 40630/RRT/S850  
 Inventor(s) : Craig L. Ogg and William W. Chow  
 Title : CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE FOR SECURE PROCESSING OF  
 VALUE-BEARING ITEMS  
 Express Mail Label No. : EL387000225US

**ADDRESS TO:** Assistant Commissioner for Patents  
 Box Patent Application  
 Washington, D.C. 20231

Date: October 16, 2000

1. ☒ **FEE TRANSMITTAL FORM** *(Submit an original, and a duplicate for fee processing)*

2. **IF A CONTINUING APPLICATION**

\_\_\_\_\_ This application is a \_\_\_\_\_ of patent application No. \_\_\_\_\_.

Prior application information: Examiner ; Group Art Unit:

☒ This application claims priority pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §119(e) and 37 CFR §1.78(a)(4), to provisional Application Nos. 60/160,491, filed October 20, 1999; 60/160,503, filed October 20, 1999; 60/160,112, filed October 18, 1999; 60/160,563, filed October 20, 1999; 60/160,041, filed October 18, 1999; 60/193,057, filed March 29, 2000; 60/193,055, filed March 29, 2000, and 60/193,056, filed March 29, 2000.

3. **APPLICATION COMPRISED OF**

**Specification**

96 Specification, claims and Abstract (total pages)

**Drawings**

10 Sheets of drawing(s) (FIGS. 1 to 10)

**Declaration and Power of Attorney**

\_\_\_\_\_ Newly executed

☒ Unexecuted declaration

\_\_\_\_\_ Copy from a prior application (37 CFR 1.63(d))(for continuation and divisional)

4. \_\_\_\_\_ **Microfiche Computer Program** *(Appendix)*

5. \_\_\_\_\_ **Nucleotide and/or Amino Acid Sequence Submission** *(if applicable, all necessary)*

\_\_\_\_\_ Computer Readable Copy

\_\_\_\_\_ Paper Copy (identical to computer copy)

\_\_\_\_\_ Statement verifying identity of above copies

6. **ALSO ENCLOSED ARE**

\_\_\_\_\_ Preliminary Amendment

**UTILITY PATENT APPLICATION TRANSMITTAL**  
**(Only for new nonprovisional applications under 37 CFR 1.53(b))**

Docket No.: 40630/RRT/S850


- ☐ A Petition for Extension of Time for the parent application and the required fee are enclosed as separate papers
- ☐ Small Entity Statement(s)
- ☐ Statement filed in parent application, status still proper and desired
- ☐ Copy of Statement filed in provisional application, status still proper and desired
- ☐ An Assignment of the invention with the Recordation Cover Sheet and the recordation fee are enclosed as separate papers
- ☐ This application is owned by pursuant to an Assignment recorded at Reel , Frame
- ☐ Information Disclosure Statement (IDS)/PTO-1449
- ☐ Copies of IDS Citations
- ☐ Certified copy of Priority Document(s) (*if foreign priority is claimed*)
- ☐ English Translation Document (*if applicable*)
- ☒ Return Receipt Postcard (MPEP 503) (should be specifically itemized).
- ☐ Other

**7. CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS**

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Respectfully submitted,

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RRT/dsz

**FEE TRANSMITTAL  
UTILITY PATENT APPLICATION**

DATE: October 16, 2000

Docket No. : 40630/RRT/S850

Inventor(s) : Craig L. Ogg and William W. Chow

Title : CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE FOR SECURE PROCESSING OF  
VALUE-BEARING ITEMS

**FEE DETERMINATION**

CLAIMS AS FILED					
	NUMBER FILED	NUMBER EXTRA	SMALL ENTITY RATE	LARGE ENTITY RATE	FEE
TOTAL CLAIMS	120 - 20	100	x \$9.00	100 x \$18.00	\$1,800.00
INDEPENDENT CLAIMS	4 - 3	1	x \$40.00	1 x \$80.00	\$80.00
MULTIPLE-DEPENDENT CLAIMS FEE			\$135.00	\$270.00	
BASIC FEE			\$355.00	\$710.00	\$710.00
TOTAL FILING FEE					\$2,590.00
List Independent Claims: 1, 42, 72, 104					

**METHOD OF PAYMENT**


☒ No filing fee enclosed

☒ No Deposit Account Authorization.

Respectfully submitted,

CHRISTIE, PARKER & HALE, LLP

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DSZ PAS279850.1\*-10/14/00 2:27 PM

1 40630/RRT/S850

CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE FOR SECURE PROCESSING  
OF VALUE-BEARING ITEMS

5

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This patent application claims the benefit of the filing date of United States Provisional Patent Applications Serial Nos. 60/160,491, filed October 20, 1999 and entitled "SECURE AND RECOVERABLE DATABASE FOR ON-LINE POSTAGE SYSTEM"; 60/160,503, filed October 20, 1999 and entitled "CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE ARCHITECTURE"; 60/160,112, filed October 18, 1999 and entitled "INTERNET POSTAL METERING SYSTEM"; 60/160,563, filed October 20, 1999 and entitled "SERVER ARCHITECTURE FOR ON-LINE POSTAGE SYSTEM"; 60/160,041, filed October 18, 1999 and entitled "CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE SECURITY APPROACH"; 60/193,057, filed March 29, 2000 and entitled "CUSTOMER GATEWAY DESIGN"; 60/193,055, filed March 29, 2000 and entitled "BROWSER-BASED IBI"; and 60/193,056, filed March 29, 2000 and entitled "MULTI-USER PSD DESIGN" the entire contents of which are hereby expressly incorporated by reference.

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

The present invention relates to secure printing of value-bearing items (VBI) preferably, postage. More specifically, the invention relates to a cryptographic module for secure printing of VBIs.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

A significant percentage of the United States Postal Service (USPS) revenue is from metered postage. Metered postage is generated by utilizing postage meters that print a special mark, also known as postal indicia, on mail pieces. Generally, printing postage and any VBI can be carried out by using mechanical meters or computer-based systems.

1 With respect to computer-based postage processing systems,  
the USPS under the Information-Based Indicia Program (IBIP) has  
published specifications for IBIP postage meters that identify  
a special purpose hardware device, known as a Postal Security  
5 Device (PSD) that is generally located at a user's site. The  
PSD, in conjunction with the user's personal computer and  
printer, functions as the IBIP postage meter. The USPS has  
published a number of documents describing the PSD  
specifications, the indicia specifications and other related and  
10 relevant information. There are also security standards for  
printing other types of VBI, such as coupons, tickets, gift  
certificates, currency, voucher and the like.

A significant drawback of existing hardware-based systems  
is that a new PSD must be locally provided to each new user,  
15 which involves significant cost. Furthermore, if the additional  
PSD breaks down, service calls must be made to the user location.  
In light of the drawbacks in hardware-based postage metering  
systems, a software-based system has been developed that does not  
require specialized hardware for each user. The software-based  
20 system meets the IBIP specifications for a PSD, using a  
centralized server-based implementation of PSDs utilizing one or  
more cryptographic modules. The system also includes a database  
for all users' information. The software-based system, however,  
has brought about new challenges.

25 The software-based system should be able to handle secure  
communications between users and the database. In a hardware-  
based system, security is generally handled by the local hardware  
piece, that is unique to each user and includes an encryption  
processor that encrypts that user's information and  
30 communications. However, as mentioned above, this hardware-based  
system has significant disadvantages.

Therefore, there is a need for a new method and apparatus  
for implementation of VBI secure printing and a secure IBIP  
postage meter over a WAN that does not require the special  
35 purpose hardware device at the user site. Furthermore, there is

1 a need for a secure system and database that are capable of preventing unauthorized access and tampering.

# SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

5 In accordance with one aspect of the present invention, an on-line VBI printing system that includes one or more cryptographic modules and a central database has been designed. The cryptographic modules serve the function of the PSDs and are capable of implementing the USPS Information Based Indicia  
 10 Program Postal Security Device Performance Criteria and the cryptographic security requirements specified by Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 140-1, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, and other required standards. The modules encipher the information stored in the  
 15 central database for all of the on-line VBI system customers and are capable of preventing access to the database by unauthorized users. Also, a secure communication network is in operation to prevent unauthorized access to the users' data stored in the centralized database. Additionally, the cryptographic module is  
 20 capable of preventing unauthorized and undetected modification, including the unauthorized modification, substitution, insertion, and deletion of VBI related data and cryptographically critical security parameters.

Each module prevents the unauthorized disclosure of the non-  
 25 public contents of the VBI data, such as a postage meter, including plaintext cryptographic keys and other critical security parameters. The module also ensures the proper operation of cryptographic security and VBI related meter functions. The module detects errors in the operation of  
 30 security mechanisms and prevents the compromise of meter data and critical cryptographic security parameters as a result of those errors.

In one aspect the present invention is a method for securing data on a computer network including a plurality of users  
 35 comprising the steps of: authenticating the plurality of users

1 for secure processing of a value bearing item; storing security  
device transaction data in a memory for ensuring authenticity and  
authority of one of the plurality of users, wherein the security  
device transaction data is related to the one of the plurality  
5 of users; and determining a state in a state machine for  
availability of one or more commands. the method is also capable  
of storing a plurality of security device transaction data in a  
database wherein, each transaction data is related to one of the  
plurality of users.

10 In another aspect the invention describes a cryptographic  
device for securing data on a computer network comprising: a  
processor programmed to authenticate a plurality of users on the  
computer network for secure processing of a value bearing item,  
wherein the processor includes a state machine for determining  
15 a state corresponding to availability of one or more commands;  
a memory for storing security device transaction data for  
ensuring authenticity of a user, wherein the security device  
transaction data is related to the one of the plurality of users;  
a cryptographic engine for cryptographically protecting data; and  
20 an interface for communicating with the computer network.

It is to be understood that the present invention is useful  
for printing not only postage, but any VBIs, such as coupons,  
tickets, gift certificates, currency, voucher and the like.

## 25 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The objects, advantages and features of this invention will  
become more apparent from a consideration of the following  
detailed description and the drawings, in which:

FIG. 1 is an exemplary block diagram for the client/server  
30 architecture of one embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 2 is an exemplary block diagram of a remote user  
computer connected to a server via Internet according to one  
embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 3 is an exemplary block diagram of a cryptographic  
35 device according to one embodiment of the present invention;

1           FIG. 4 is an exemplary block diagram of servers, databases,  
and services according to one embodiment of the present  
invention;

5           FIG. 5 is an exemplary block diagram of a client software,  
a cryptographic module, and a typical transaction between them  
during an operational state according to one embodiment of the  
present invention;

10          FIG. 6 is an exemplary state transition diagram for a  
cryptographic device according to one embodiment of the present  
invention;

FIG. 7 is an exemplary diagram of audit chaining according  
to one embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 8 is an exemplary diagram of multiple user PSD  
according to one embodiment of the present invention.;

15          FIG. 9 is an exemplary diagram of multiple users using a  
gateway server according to one embodiment of the present  
invention; and

20          FIG. 10 is an exemplary diagram of a browser-based design  
with or without a UI according to one embodiment of the present  
invention.

#### DETAILED DESCRIPTION

25          In one aspect, the system and method of the present  
invention prevent unauthorized electronic access to a database  
subsystem and secure customers' related data, among others. One  
level of security is achieved by protecting the database  
subsystem by a postal server subsystem. The postal server  
subsystem controls preferably, all communications with the  
database subsystem by executing an authentication algorithm to  
30          prevent unauthorized access. Another level of security is  
achieved by encrypting preferably, all communications between the  
client system and the postal server subsystem. The encryption-  
decryption function is employed using commonly known algorithms,  
such as, Rivest, Shamir and Adleman ("RSA") public key  
35          encryption, DES, Triple-DES, Pseudo-random number generation, and



1 the like algorithms. Additionally, DSA signature, and SHA-1  
hashing algorithms may be used to digitally sign a postage  
indicium.

5 Another measure of security is the interaction between a  
cryptographic module and the database subsystem whenever a PSD  
transaction (security device transaction) is initiated. The  
cryptographic module and the database subsystem cross-verify the  
last PSD transaction (security device transaction) before  
proceeding with the next PSD transaction. If the last  
10 transaction record in the cryptographic module and the database  
subsystem do not match, then the on-line postage system shuts  
down until the situation can be investigated. This verification  
process protects against attempts of unauthorized individuals to  
replace the database subsystem. The registers in the  
15 cryptographic modules are cryptographically protected to achieve  
another level of security.

An exemplary on-line postage system is described in U.S.  
patent Application No. 09/163,993 filed September 15, 1998, the  
entire contents of which are hereby incorporated by reference  
20 herein. The on-line postage system includes an authentication  
protocol that operates in conjunction with the USPS requirements.  
The system utilizes on-line postage system software comprising  
user code that resides on a client system and controller code  
that resides on a server system. The on-line postage system  
25 allows a user to print a postal indicium at home, at the office,  
or any other desired place in a secure, convenient, inexpensive  
and fraud-free manner. The system comprises a user system  
electronically connected to a server system, which in turn is  
connected to a USPS system.

30 Each of the cryptographic modules may be available for use  
by any user. When a user requests a PSD service, one of the  
available modules is loaded with data belonging to the user's  
account and the transaction is performed. When a module is  
loaded with a user's data ,that module becomes the user's PSD.  
35 The database record containing each user's PSD data is referred

1 to as the "PSD package" (security device transaction data).  
After each PSD transaction is completed, the user's PSD package  
is updated and returned to a database external to the module.  
The database becomes an extension of the module's memory and  
5 stores not only the items specified by the IBIP for storage  
inside the PSD, but also the user's personal cryptographic keys  
and other security relevant data items (SRDI) and status  
information needed for continuous operation. Movement of this  
sensitive data between the modules and the database is secured  
10 to ensure that PSD packages could not be compromised.

In one embodiment, the server system is remotely located in  
a separate location from the client system. All communications  
between the client and the server are preferably accomplished via  
the Internet. FIG. 1 illustrates a remote client system 220a  
15 connected to a server system 102 via the Internet 221. The  
client system includes a processor unit 223, a monitor 230,  
printer port 106, a mouse 225, a printer 235, and a keyboard 224.  
Server system 102 includes Postage servers 109, Database 130, and  
cryptographic modules 110.

20 An increase in the number of servers within the server  
system 102 will not negatively impact the performance of the  
system, since the system design allows for scalability. The  
Server system 102 is designed in such a way that all of the  
business transactions are processed in the servers and not in the  
25 database. By locating the transaction processing in the servers,  
increases in the number of transactions can be easily handled by  
adding additional servers. Also, each transaction processed in  
the servers is stateless, meaning the application does not  
remember the specific hardware device the last transaction  
30 utilized. Because of this stateless transaction design, multiple  
servers can be added to each appropriate subsystem in order to  
handle increased loads.

Furthermore, each cryptographic module is a stateless  
device, meaning that a PSD package can be passed to any device  
35 because the application does not rely upon any information about

1 what occurred with the previous PSD package. Therefore, multiple  
cryptographic modules can also be added to each appropriate  
subsystem in order to handle increased loads. A PSD package for  
each cryptographic module is a database record, stored in the  
5 server database, that includes information pertaining to one  
customer's service that would normally be protected inside a  
cryptographic module. The PSD package includes all data needed  
to restore the PSD to its last known state when it is next loaded  
into a cryptographic module. This includes the items that the  
10 IBIP specifications require to be stored inside the PSD,  
information required to return the PSD to a valid state when the  
record is reloaded from the database, and data needed for record  
security and administrative purposes.

In one embodiment, the items included in a PSD package  
15 include ascending and descending registers (the ascending  
register "AR" records the amount of postage that is dispensed or  
printed on each transaction and the descending register "DR"  
records the value or amount of postage that may be dispensed and  
decreases from an original or charged amount as postage is  
20 printed.), device ID, indicia key certificate serial number,  
licensing ZIP code, key token for the indicia signing key, the  
user secrets, key for encrypting user secrets, data and time of  
last transaction, the last challenge received from the client,  
the operational state of the PSD, expiration dates for keys, the  
25 passphrase repetition list and the like.

As a result, the need for specific PSDs being attached to  
specific cryptographic modules is eliminated. A Postal Server  
subsystem provides cryptographic module management services that  
allow multiple cryptographic modules to exist and function on one  
30 server, so additional cryptographic modules can easily be  
installed on a server. The Postal Sever subsystem is easy to  
scale by adding more cryptographic modules and using commonly  
known Internet load-balancing techniques to route inbound  
requests to the new cryptographic modules.

35

1 Referring back to FIG. 1, Postage servers 109 includes one  
or more Postal servers and provide indicia creation, account  
maintenance, and revenue protection functionality for the on-line  
postage system. The Postage servers 109 include several physical  
5 servers in several distinct logical groupings, or services as  
described below. The individual servers could be located within  
one facility, or in several facilities, physically separated by  
great distance but connected by secure communication links.

Cryptographic modules 110 are responsible for creating PSDs  
10 and manipulating PSD data to protect sensitive information from  
disclosure, generating the cryptographic components of the  
digital indicia, and securely adjusting the user registration.  
When a user wishes to print VBI , for example, postage or  
purchase additional VBI or postage value, a user state is  
15 instantiated in the PSD implemented within one of the  
cryptographic modules 110. Database 111 includes all the data  
accessible on-line for indicia creation, account maintenance, and  
revenue protection processes. Postage servers 109, Database 130,  
and cryptographic modules 110 are maintained in a physically  
20 secured environment, such as a vault.

FIG. 2 shows a simplified system block diagram of a typical  
Internet client/server environment used by an on-line postage  
system in one embodiment of the present invention. PCs 220a-220n  
used by the postage purchasers are connected to the Internet 221  
25 through the communication links 233a-233n. Each PC has access  
to one or more printers 235. Optionally, as is well understood  
in the art, a local network 234 may serve as the connection  
between some of the PCs, such as the PC 220a and the Internet 221  
or other connections. Servers 222a-222m are also connected to  
30 the Internet 221 through respective communication links. Servers  
222a-222m include information and databases accessible by PCs  
220a-220n. The on-line VBI system of the present invention  
resides on one or more of Servers 222a-222m.

In this embodiment, each client system 220a-220m includes  
35 a CPU 223, a keyboard 224, a mouse 225, a mass storage device

1 231, main computer memory 227, video memory 228, a communication  
interface 232a, and an input/output device 226 coupled and  
interacting via a communication bus. The data and images to be  
displayed on the monitor 230 are transferred first from the video  
5 memory 228 to the video amplifier 229 and then to the monitor  
230. The communication interface 232a communicates with the  
servers 222a-222m via a network link 233a. The network link  
connects the client system to a local network 234. The local  
network 234 communicates with the Internet 221.

10 In one embodiment, a customer, preferably licensed by the  
USPS and registered with an IBIP vendor (such as Stamps.com),  
sends a request for authorization to print a desired amount of  
VBI, such as postage. The server system verifies that the user's  
account holds sufficient funds to cover the requested amount of  
15 postage, and if so, grants the request. The server then sends  
a cryptographically authenticated response specifying the VBI to  
the client system. The client system then sends image  
information for printing of a postal indicium for the granted  
amount to a printer so that the postal indicium is printed on an  
20 envelope or label.

In one embodiment, when a client system sends a VBI print  
request to the server system, the request needs to be  
authenticated before the client system is allowed to print the  
VBI, and while the VBI is being printed. The request is  
25 cryptographically authenticated using an authentication code.  
The client system sends a password (or passphrase) entered by a  
user to the server for verification. If the password fails, a  
preferably asynchronous dynamic password verification method  
terminates the session and printing of the VBI is aborted. Also,  
30 the server system communicates with a system located at a  
certification authority for verification and authentication  
purposes.

In one embodiment, the information processing components of  
the on-line postage system include a client system, a postage  
35 server system located in a highly secure facility, a USPS system

1 and the Internet as the communication medium among those systems.  
The information processing equipment communicates over a secured  
communication line.

Preferably, the security and authenticity of the information  
5 communicated among the systems are accomplished on a software  
level through the built-in features of a Secured Socket Layer  
(SSL) Internet communication protocol. An encryption hardware  
module embedded in the server system is also used to secure  
information as it is processed by the secure system and to ensure  
10 authenticity and legitimacy of requests made and granted.

The on-line VBI system does not require any special purpose  
hardware for the client system. The client system is implemented  
in the form of software that can be executed on a user computer  
(client system) allowing the user computer to function as a  
15 virtual VBI meter. The software can only be executed for the  
purpose of printing the VBI indicia when the user computer is in  
communication with a server computer located, for example, at a  
VBI meter vendor's facility (server system). The server system  
is capable of communicating with one or more client systems  
20 simultaneously.

In one embodiment of the present invention, the  
cryptographic modules 110 are FIPS 140-1 certified hardware cards  
that include firmware to implement PSD functionality in a  
cryptographically secure way. The cryptographic modules are  
25 inserted into any of the servers in the Postal Server  
Infrastructure. The cryptographic modules are responsible for  
creating PSDs and manipulating PSD data to generate and verify  
digitally signed indicia. Since the PSD data is created and  
signed by a private key known only to the module, the PSD data  
30 may be stored externally to the cryptographic modules without  
compromising security.

FIG. 3 is a block diagram of an exemplary cryptographic  
module. Processor 302 is electrically coupled to the RAM 303,  
NVM 304, ROM 305. I/O interface 307, Random Number Generator  
35 (RNG) 308, Cipher Engine 310, and Clock 309 through the bus 301.

1 NVM 304 and ROM 305 are protected from unauthorized access by the  
Hardware Locks control 306. A Security sensing & Response (SSR)  
circuit 311 detects any attempts to tamper with the module and  
acts accordingly. The SSR circuit includes sensors to protect  
5 against attacks involving probe penetration, power sequencing,  
radiation, temperature manipulation, and the like, consistent  
with some security standards, such as FIPS 140-1 Level 3 and 4  
requirements. If the tamper sensors are triggered, the cipher  
Engine 310 resets its critical keys, destroys its certification,  
10 and is rendered inoperable.

Initially, the module generates a unique key pair, which is  
stored in the secured NVM. The tamper detection circuitry is  
activated at this time and remains active throughout the useful  
life of the module, protecting this private key, as well as all  
15 other keys and sensitive data. The module's private key is  
certified by a private key and the certificate is retained in the  
module. Subsequently, the module's private key is used to sign  
module status responses which, in conjunction with a series of  
public key certificates, demonstrates that the module remains  
20 intact and is genuine. As a result, only the software that has  
been signed by an entity trusted by the module (via the embedded  
public key) will be loaded.

Cipher Engine 310 supports multiple custom cryptographic  
engines and other accelerated state machines to provide complex  
25 and numerically intensive operations required for encryption/  
decryption, authentication, and key management. RNG 308  
generates the required data for the Cipher Engine. Clock &  
Calender circuit 309 generates real-time clock and calender for  
the Cipher Engine and the I/O interface 307 provides interface  
30 to other devices on a computer network.

In one embodiment, Cipher Engine 310 includes the following  
logical elements:

- A DES Engine including the following features:
  - DES, Triple DES, MAC and Triple-DES MAC functions

35

- 1       •     Electronic codebook (ECB) support and cipher block chain (CBC) modes of operation
- 3 internal 64-bit key registers loaded from a ISA port
- 64-bit initial vector register loadable from a ISA
- 5       port
- 64-bit input & output registers readable from both a 16-bit ISA port or a 32-bit PCI add-on port via the output FIFO
- Optional DES assist for data padding of data blocks
- 10       which are not multiples of 64-bytes

A SHA Engine including the following features:

- SHA-1 secure hash algorithm
- Four 32-bit K registers with fast initialization to FIPS-180 Constants via an ISA port accessible control
- 15       register
- Five 32-bit H registers with fast initialization to FIPS-180 initial values by an ISA port accessible control register. Hashing data loadable into H registers via the 16-bit ISA port or the 32-bit PCI
- 20       add-on port and input FIFO. Hash results readable from five 32-bit H registers via ISA port.
- Five internal registers for SHA-1 hash results creation
- SHA engine exercises FIPS 180-1 algorithm. Digital
- 25       Signature Standard FIPS PUB-186 pseudo random number creation possible by programming K constants and H initialization vector registers via the ISA bus input.

A RSA Engine capable of performing the following modular arithmetic and exponentiation functions for high speed RSA

30    encryption:



1	Modular Exponentiation With CRT (chinese remainder theorem)	$R = A^{(B_p, B_q)} \bmod (N_p, N_q)$
	Modular exponentiation	$R = A^B \bmod N$
5	Modular multiplication	$R = (A * B) \bmod N$
	Modular addition	$R = (A + B) \bmod N$
	Addition	$R = (A + B)$
	Subtraction	$R = (A - B)$
10	2's complement	$R = \sim A + 1$
	Signature	$R = A^B \bmod N$ ; if $(2R \geq N) R = N - R$
	Verify	$R = A^B \bmod N$ ; if $(R \bmod 16 \neq 6) R = N - R$

15 The RSA engine is a 2048-bit engine with the following registers:

	Operand Register	Length (bits)	Contents
	A	2048	Data
	B	2048	Exponent
20	$B_p$	1088	CRT Mod Expo. only
	$B_q$	1024	CRT Mod Expo. only
	N	2048	Module
	$N_q$	1088	CRT Mod Expo. only
25	$N_p$	1024	CRT Mod Expo. only
	U	1088 (CRT only)	Multiplicative inverse for CRT
	R	2048	Results

30 Registers  $B_1$   $B_{p1}$   $B_{q1}$   $N_1$   $N_{p1}$   $N_q$  and U are write only from the ISA port of the UltraCypher module.

Register R (results) is read only from the ISA port of the UltraCypher module  
Chinese Remainder (CRT) Operands

A = data

$B_p$  = the largest of two odd primes so  $N = N_p * N_q$

35  $B_q$  = the smallest of two odd primes so  $N = N_p * N_q$

1  $N_p = B \bmod (N_p - 1)$

$N_q = B \bmod (N_q - 1)$

$U = \text{Multiplicative inverse: } N_q^{-1} \bmod N_p$

5 Exponentiation performance can be enhanced by enabling the built-in Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) algorithm.

In this embodiment, there are ten 16-bit Control, Setup, and Status registers which are written and read via the ISA bus. Some are read only and some are write only from outside of the module. These registers control the data paths and various  
10 engines inside of the module and provide information as to the status of the engines and FIFO's.

A 64-bit shift register is provided for the collecting of Random data bits generated from outside the module. The external 1-bit input (usually a random noise source) is sampled and loaded  
15 into bit-0 of the shift register. The sampling rate is controlled from control register bits which are loaded via the ISA bus. The collected data bits are shifted after each new sampling of data. When the shift register is full of new data an interrupt is generated and the shift register contents may be  
20 read from the ISA data port.

A 128x32-bit Input FIFO and a similar Output FIFO is provided in the module to buffer a PCI Add-on bus.

25

INPUT FIFO Inputs	INPUT FIFO Outputs	OUTPUT FIFO Inputs	OUTPUT FIFO Outputs
PCI add-on bus	DES engine	DES engine	PCI add-on bus
ISA bus	SHA-1 engine	ISA bus	ISA bus
	OUTPUT FIFO	INPUT FIFO	
30	ISA bus		

A multipurpose 16-bit data interface supports an ISA 16-bit cycles. Addressing of the module's internal registers is via the ISA address bus. The PCI Add-on bus is capable of supporting PCI bus master. There are also 8 IRQ interrupt outputs, reset, other  
35 control lines, clock I/O.

1       The cryptographic module of the present invention may be embodied in a single-chip module, a multi-chip embedded module, a multi-chip standalone module, embedded in software running on a computer such as a personal computer, or the like.

5       The on-line VBI system is based on a client/server architecture. Generally, in a system based on client/server architecture the server system delivers information to the client system. That is, the client system requests the services of a generally larger computer. In one embodiment, the client is a  
10   local personal computer and the server is a more powerful group of computers that house the information. The connection from the client to the server is made via a Local Area Network, a phone line or a TCP/IP based WAN on the Internet. A primary reason to set up a client/server network is to allow many clients access  
15   to the same applications and files stored on the server system.

      In one embodiment, Postage servers 109 include a string of servers connected to the Internet, for example, through a T1 line, protected by a firewall. The firewall permits a client to communicate with a server system, only if the information packet  
20   transmitted by the client system complies with a security policy set by the server system. The firewall not only protects the system from unauthorized users on the Internet, it also separates the Public Network (PUBNET) from the Private Network (PRVNET). This ensures that packets from the Internet will not go to any  
25   location but the PUBNET. The string of servers form the different subsystems of the on-line postal system. The services provided by the different subsystems of the on-line postage system are designed to allow flexibility and expansion and reduce specific hardware dependency.

30       The Database subsystem is comprised of multiple databases. FIG. 4 illustrates an overview of the on-line VBI system which includes the database subsystems. Database 411 includes the Affiliate DBMS and the Source IDs DBMS. The Affiliate DBMS manages affiliate information (e.g., affiliate's name, phone  
35   number, and affiliate's Website information) that is stored on

1 the Affiliate Database. Using the data from this database,  
marketing and business reports are generated. The Source IDs  
Database contains information about the incoming links to the  
vendor's Website (e.g., partners' information, what services the  
5 vendor offers, what marketing program is associated with the  
incoming links, and co-branding information). Using the data  
from this database, marketing and business reports are generated.

The Online Store Database 412 contains commerce product  
information, working orders, billing information, password reset  
10 table, and other marketing related information. Website database  
410 keeps track of user accesses to the vendor website. This  
database keeps track of user who access the vendor website, users  
who are downloading information and programs, and the links from  
which users access the vendor website. After storing these data  
15 on the Website Database 410, software tools are used to generate  
the following information:

- Web Site Status
- Web Site Reports
- Form Results
- 20 • Download Successes
- Signup, Downloads, and Demographic Graphs
- Web Server Statistics (Analog)
- Web Server Statistics (Web Analyzer)

Offline database 409 manages the VBI (e.g., postal) data  
25 except meter information, postal transactions data, financial  
transactions data (e.g., credit card purchases, free postage  
issued, bill credits, and bill debits), customer marketing  
information, commerce product information, meter license  
information, meter resets, meter history, and meter movement  
30 information. Consolidation Server 413 acts as a repository for  
data, centralizing data for easy transportation outside the vault  
400. The Consolidation Server hosts both file and database  
services, allowing both dumps of activity logs and reports as  
well as a consolidation point for all database data.

35

1           The Offline Reporting Engine MineShare Server 415 performs  
extraction transformation from the holding database that received  
transaction data from the Consolidated Database (Commerce  
database 406, Membership database 408, and Postal Database 407).  
5   Also, the Offline Reporting Engine MineShare Server handles some  
administrative tasks. Transaction data in the holding database  
contains the transaction information about meter licensing  
information, meter reset information, postage purchase  
transactions, and credit card transactions. After performing  
10 extraction transformation, business logic data are stored on  
Offline Database 409. Transaction reports are generated using  
the data on the Offline Database. Transaction reports contain  
marketing and business information.

          The Data Warehouse database 414 includes all customer  
15 information, financial transactions, and aggregated information  
for marketing queries (e.g., how many customers have purchased  
postage). In one embodiment, commerce Database 406 includes a  
Payment Database, an E-mail Database, and a Stamp Mart Database.  
The E-mail DBMS manages access to the contents of e-mail that  
20 were sent out to everyone by vendor servers. The Stamp Mart  
database handles order form processing. The E-commerce Server  
404 provides e-commerce related services on a user/group  
permission basis. It provides commerce-related services such as  
payment processing, pricing plan support and billing as well as  
25 customer care functionality and LDAP membership personalization  
services.

          A Credit Card Service is invoked by the E-commerce Server  
404 to authorize and capture funds from the customer's credit  
card account and to transfer them to the vendor's merchant bank.  
30 A Billing Service is used to provide bills through e-mail to  
customers based on selected billing plans. An ACH service runs  
automatically at a configurable time. It retrieves all pending  
ACH requests and batches them to be sent to bank for postage  
purchases (i.e. money destined for the USPS), or Chase for fee  
35 payments which is destined for the vendor account.

1           The E-commerce DBMS 406 manages access to the vendor  
specific Payment, Credit Card, and Email Databases. A Membership  
DBMS manages access to the LDAP membership directory database 408  
that hosts specific customer information and customer membership  
5       data. A Postal DBMS manages access to the Postal Database 407  
where USPS specific data such as meter and licensing information  
are stored. A Postal Server 401 provides secure services to the  
Client, including client authentication, postage purchase, and  
indicia generation. The Postal Server requires cryptographic  
10       modules to perform all functions that involve client  
authentication, postage purchase, and indicia generation.

Postal Transaction Server 403 provides business logic for  
postal functions such as device authorization and postage  
purchase/register manipulation. The Postal Transaction Server  
15       requires the cryptographic modules to perform all functions.  
There are four Client Support Servers. Address Matching Server  
(AMS) 417 verifies the correct address specified by a user. When  
the user enters a delivery address or a return address using the  
Client Software, the user does not need the address matching  
20       database on the user's local machine to verify the accuracy of  
the address. The Client software connects to the vendor's server  
and uses the central address database obtained from the USPS to  
verify the accuracy of the address. If the address is incorrect,  
the client software provides the user with a prioritized list of  
25       addresses to match the correct address. These choices are ranked  
in a user definable order. This information is represented using  
a plain text format.

The Client Support Servers 417 provides the following  
services: a Pricing Plan service, an Auto Update service, and a  
30       Printer Config service. The Pricing Plan Service provides  
information on pricing plans and payment methods available to the  
user. It also provides what credit cards are supported and  
whether ACH is supported. This information is represented  
preferably using a plain text format. The Auto Update Service  
35       verifies whether the user is running the latest Client Software.

1 If there is newer Client Software, the Auto Update Server  
downloads the new patches to the user computer. The Client  
Support Database has tables for the client software update  
information. This information is represented using a plain text  
5 format.

Before the user tries to print postage, the user sends his  
or her printer driver information over the Internet in plain  
text. The Printer Config Service looks up the printer driver  
information in the Printer Driver Database to determine whether  
10 the printer driver is supported or not. When the user tries to  
configure the printer, the user prints a test envelope to test  
whether the postage printing is working properly or not. This  
testing envelope information is sent over the Internet in plain  
text and is stored in the Client Support Database.

15 MeterGen server 422 makes calls into the cryptographic  
module to create sufficient meters to ensure that the vendor can  
meet customer acquisition demands. SMTP Server 418 communicates  
with other SMTP servers, and it is used to forward e-mail to  
users. Gatekeeper Server works as a proxy server by handling the  
20 security and authentication validation for the smart card users  
to access customer and administration information that reside in  
the vault.

The Proxy Server 423 uses the Netscape™ Enterprise SSL  
library to provide a secure connection to the vault 400. Audit  
25 File Server 419 acts as a repository for module transaction logs.  
The Audit logs are cryptographically protected. The Audit File  
Server verifies the audit logs that are digitally signed. The  
audit logs are verified in real time as they are being created.  
Postal Server writes audit logs to a shared hard drive on the  
30 Audit File Server. After these logs are verified, the Audit File  
Server preferably moves them from the shared hard drive to a  
storage device that is not shared by any of the vendor servers.

Provider Server provides reporting and external  
communication functionality including the following services.  
35

1 CMLS Service forwards license applications and it processes  
responses from CMLS. The CMLS Service uses cryptographic  
functions provided by the Stamps.com Crypt library to decrypt the  
user's SSN/Tax ID/Employee ID. CMRS Service reports meter  
5 movement and resetting to the USPS Computerized Meter Resetting  
infrastructure. ACH Service is responsible for submitting ACH  
postage purchase requests to the USPS lockbox account at the  
bank. The CMLS Service uses cryptographic functions to decrypt  
the user's ACH account number.

10 After decrypting ACH account information, the ACH is  
encrypted using the vendor's script library. Then, the encrypted  
ACH file is e-mailed to the Commerce Group by the SMTP server.  
When the Commerce Group receives this encrypted e-mail, the  
vendor's Decrypt utility application is used to decrypt the ACH  
15 e-mail. After verifying the ACH information, the Commerce Group  
sends the ACH information through an encrypted device first and  
then uses a modem to upload the ACH information to a proper bank.  
The Certificate Authority issues certificates for all IBIP  
meters. The certificates are basically used to provide  
20 authentication for indicia produced by their respective meters.

The following are exemplary steps describing the certificate  
authorization process:

- MeterGen asks the module to create a meter package,
- The module returns a package and the meter's public key,
- 25 • MeterGen creates a certificate request with the public key,  
signs the request with a USPS-issued smartcard, and submits  
the request to the USPS Certificate Authority,
- The Certificate Authority verifies the request came from  
the vendor then, it creates a new certificate and returns  
30 it to MeterGen,
- MeterGen verifies the certificate using the USPS  
Certificate Authority's certificate (e.g., to ensure it  
wasn't forged) and stores the certificate information in  
the package. The package is now ready to be associated  
35 with a customer.



1           The Postal Server subsystem 401 controls client and remote  
administration access to server functionality, authenticates  
clients and allows clients to establish a secure connection to  
the on-line postage system. The Postal Server subsystem also  
5 manages access to USPS specific data such as PSD information and  
a user's license information. The Postal Server subsystem  
queries the Postal portion of the Database subsystem for the  
necessary information to complete the task. The query travels  
through the firewall to the Postal portion of the Database  
10 subsystem. The Postal Server subsystem is the subsystem in the  
Public Network that has access to the Database subsystem.

          In one embodiment of the present invention, Postal Server  
401 is a standalone server process that provides secure  
connections to both the clients and the server administration  
15 utilities, providing both client authentication and connection  
management functionality to the system. Postal Server 401 also  
houses postal-specific services that require high levels of  
security, such as purchasing postage or printing indicia. Postal  
Server 401 is comprised of at least one server, and the number  
20 of servers increases when more clients need to be authenticated,  
are purchasing postage or are printing postage indicia.

          The growth in the number of servers of the Postal Server  
will not impact the performance of the system since the system  
design allows for scalability. The Postal Server is designed in  
25 such a way that all of the business logic is processed in the  
servers and not in the database. By locating the transaction  
processing in the servers, increases in the number of  
transactions can be easily handled by adding additional servers.  
Also, since each transaction is stateless (the application does  
30 not remember the specific hardware device the last transaction  
utilized), multiple machines can be added to each subsystem in  
order to handle increased loads. In one embodiment, load  
balancing hardware and software techniques are used to distribute  
traffic among the multiple servers.

35

1           Typically, the security requirements of an online VBI system  
entail protections of two basic types: Logical and Physical, or  
both.   Logical protections employ cryptographic techniques  
involving encryption algorithms and authentication processes.  
5   Physical security measures are required to prevent undetected  
tamper and to protect stored critical data from unauthorized  
access, modification or destruction. The PSD functionality and  
data are to be protected by the cryptographic modules.

          For the embodiment that includes printing postage, system  
10 functional requirements are based on the IBIP specifications.  
The PSD is preferably located at a central location (for example,  
the Internet server) and may service multiple clients. The PSD's  
functions include client authorization (assignment of a "meter"  
to a client), postage register arithmetic operations, creation  
15 and printing of a valid postage, messages between the provider  
infrastructure and PSD, and the like.

          The following functional security objectives are achieved  
by the cryptographic module according to one aspect of the  
present invention:

- 20   •   preventing unauthorized and undetected modification of  
data, including the unauthorized modification,  
substitution, insertion, and deletion of postage related  
data and cryptographically critical security parameters;  
•   preventing the unauthorized disclosure of the non-public  
25 contents of the postage meter, including plaintext  
cryptographic keys and other critical security parameters;  
•   ensuring the proper operation of cryptographic security and  
postage related meter functions;  
•   detecting errors in the operation of security mechanisms  
30 and to prevent the compromise of meter data and critical  
cryptographic security parameters as a result of those  
errors;  
•   providing indications of the operational state of the  
postage meter; and

35

- 1 • employing generally accepted security methods for the protection of the meter and cryptographic module, and their contents.

5 The cryptographic module is capable of supporting authorized roles and the corresponding services that can be performed within those roles. Since the module can support multiple concurrent operators, the module internally maintains the separation of the roles and services performed by each operator. Furthermore, a cryptographic module is used to employ access control mechanisms  
10 to authenticate an operator accessing the module (either directly or indirectly via a computer process acting on his or her behalf) and to verify that the operator is authorized to assume the desired role and to perform the desired services within that role.

15 In one embodiment, the roles supported by the module includes the following roles:

- Security Officer role initiates key management functions, including import, export, activation and de-activation of keys.
- 20 • Key Custodian role takes possession of (encrypted) shares of keys during key export and enter them during key import.
- Administrator role manages the user access control database.
- Auditor role manages (views, saves, archives, and deletes)  
25 audit logs.
- Provider role transmits signed messages to the PSD's for postage refilling and other provider functions.
- User role performs the expected IBIP postal meter operations.
- 30 • Certificate Authority role allows the PSD's public key certificate to be loaded and verified.

Access to the first four of the above listed roles is preferably obtained by logging on from a computer connected to the cryptographic module. Software applications on the computer  
35 and in the module first establish a secure communications channel

1 (a session). A session master key is established using a NIST  
approved protocol, for example, anonymous unauthenticated Diffie-  
Hellman key exchange. The Diffie-Hellman system parameters,  $p$  and  
5  $q$ , are embedded in the software of the module and the associated  
computer. Because the Diffie-Hellman protocol is vulnerable to  
certain attacks, preferably, the computer and the module are  
isolated from the LAN whenever a secure session is required. The  
master key is then used to derive transaction keys (for MACing  
and encrypting) that are changed after each message is  
10 transmitted.

Once the secure session with the module is established, the  
entities logging on can input their names and passphrases to  
provide identity based authentication for the selected role.  
During the initializing state of the module, access control data  
15 for the entity that will assume the administrator role is entered  
in a module access control database. This allows the  
administrator to log on and enter access control data for all  
other entities who will require access to the module.

The confidentiality requirement in FIPS 140-1 mandates  
20 encryption of all sensitive security parameters, including  
passwords. The cryptographic module of the present invention  
establishes the session and its security services first, and then  
transmits the password over the encrypted (and authenticated)  
channel.

25 The user passphrase as typed on the keyboard is hashed by  
the host machine and the module only has knowledge of the hash  
value. In the remainder of this document, the hashed passphrase  
as used to get access to the module is called the password.

Preferably, there is no operational requirement to have more  
30 than one user logged on at the same time, or to have users with  
more than one role. This is desirable because of separation of  
duties. In one embodiment, for each action that is requested,  
the access control makes it clear which user requested it, and  
what his role(s) is (are). This holds irrespective of whether

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1 the request is granted or denied. This would be difficult to achieve if more than one user is logged on at the same time.

Certain roles have disjoint sets of authorized commands. For example, an Auditor is not authorized to perform any operational or key management related commands. While it is possible to check that a user does not possess certain roles as well as verifying that he does possess another role (e.g., verify that the user is *not* an Administrator, and is a Security Officer), this would complicate the code and the design. A more elegant and foolproof method is to disallow users to hold multiple roles. If one physical user ever has to have more than one role, an easy solution is to provide multiple accounts for this user, one account for each role.

In one embodiment, for each user, the following user profile data is maintained inside the module, in permanent storage:

- Username (User ID, UID)
- User Role (Role ID, RID)
- Password (hashed passphrase)
- Logon failure count
- Logon failure limit
- Logon time-out limit
- Account expiration
- Password expiration
- Password period (the period for which password validity is granted when changing it).

The following functions are provided for access management:

- Initialization of the access control database.
- Begin Admin (transition to Administrative state).
- End Admin (transition back to Operational state).
- Creation of an account.
- Deletion of an account.
- Modification of an account.
- Viewing the access control database. This command lists all users and their roles, account expiration, last access, but (of course) not the user passwords.

- 1       •     Logon.
- Logoff.
- Query Current User Role.
- Query Current User ID.
- 5       •     Change password.
- Set the internal module clock.
- Get Status.

          The initialization of the access control database creates the minimal set of users required by the module. This set  
10 includes one Administrator, one Security Officer and at least two Key Custodians. This command is the first command in Initializing state, as all other commands require one of these users. Creation, deletion and modification of an account and access control database and setting the internal module clock are  
15 restricted to users with Administrator role, in Administrative state only. Administrative state is entered by the Start Admin command, issued by a Security Officer in Operational state.

          All sensitive Administrative commands are collected in Administrative state and require Administrator user role. This  
20 separation of roles ensures dual control. Secondly, the transition to Administrative state will ensure that no operational commands can be issued by the Administrator (separation of duties). Finally, Administrative state can only be reached from Operational state, ensuring that initialization  
25 of the module has been completed successfully before any administrative command can be issued. The End Admin command causes the module to transition back to Operational state.

          Preferably, the cryptographic module only allows one session to be established at a time. After authenticating to select a  
30 role, the entity can then issue any command that is available to that role. Preferably, meter users are authenticated on a command-by-command basis. During the user registration process, a DES MAC key, generated by the client cryptographic software, is transmitted to the module and is stored in the client's PSD  
35 package. Each command from a user that requests PSD services is

1 DES MAC'ed with his personal DES MAC key which allows the module  
to authenticate the user. Many clients can be simultaneously  
connected to the transaction server and the module(s) will  
respond to their requests for service as each request is received  
5 from a client.

The provider is authenticated on a command-by-command basis.  
Provider messages are signed using DSA. The signature is  
verified using the public key which is loaded into the module  
when it is initialized for postal operation. The certificate  
10 authority role is authenticated by using the Certificate  
Authority ("CA") certificate to verify the signature on the PSD's  
public key certificate. In one embodiment, the module implements  
identity based authentication for all roles which meets the  
requirements of FIPS 140-1, level 3, in the area of roles and  
15 services.

In one embodiment of the present invention, the  
cryptographic module is implemented within an IBM 4758  
cryptographic Coprocessor to securely print VBIs. The IBM 4758  
to provides a set of cryptographic hardware and software within  
20 a protective enclosure that could be customized through  
additional software development. The IBM 4758 specification is  
described in "Building a High-Performance, Programmable Secure  
Coprocessor," S.W. Smith and S. Weingart, IBM T.J. Watson  
Research Center, February 17, 1998; and "IBM 4758 Cryptographic  
25 Coprocessor Specification," available on IBM's website  
(www.IBM.com), the contents of which are hereby incorporated by  
reference herein.

The module's software is divided into four separately  
controlled layers. Software layers zero and one allow the module  
30 to initialize itself after power up, run self-tests, and include  
functions to cryptographically authenticate software loaded into  
layers two and three. The 4758 module, including the software  
of layer zero and one, has received a Security Level 4  
certificate from NIST. In this embodiment, the present invention

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1 is implemented by developing a new and proprietary crypto service and postal application software for installation in layer three.

FIPS 140-1 cryptographic security requirements are graded into four levels of increasing security and assurance. At the transaction server, SSL cryptographic functions may be implemented with software at security level 1, or may employ a cryptographic module to achieve a greater level of security. For the cryptographic module of the present invention, security level 3 requirements are specified for each of the applicable FIPS 140-1 security areas, except Physical Security, which is specified as level 4. The following are brief descriptions of level 3 and level 4 security principles.

Level 3 provides for identity-based authentication, which is stronger than the role-based authentication used in level 2. The module need to authenticate the identity of an operator and verify that the identified operator is authorized to assume a specific role and perform a corresponding set of services.

Level 3 also provides stronger requirements for entering and outputting critical security parameters. The data ports used for critical security parameters need to be physically separated or logically distinct from other data ports. Furthermore, the parameters need to either be entered into or output from the module in encrypted form, in which case they may travel through enclosing or intervening systems, or be directly entered into or output from the module (without passing through enclosing or intervening systems) using split knowledge procedures.

Level 3 allows software cryptography in multi-user, timeshared systems when a trusted operating system is employed along with a trusted path for the entry and output of critical security parameters. A trusted operating system with a trusted path would have the capability to protect cryptographic software and critical security parameters from other untrusted software that may run on the system. Such a system could prevent plaintext from being mixed with ciphertext, and it could prevent the unintentional transmission of plaintext keys.



1 Security level 4 provides the highest level of security.  
Level 4 physical security provides an envelope of protection  
around the cryptographic module. Whereas, the tamper detection  
circuits of lower level modules may be bypassed, the intent of  
5 level 4 protection is to detect a penetration of the device from  
any direction. For example, if one attempts to cut through the  
enclosure of the cryptographic module, the attempt is detected  
and all critical security parameters are preferably zeroized.  
Level 4 devices are particularly useful for operation in a  
10 physically unprotected environment where an intruder could  
possibly tamper with the device.

Level 4 also protects a module against a compromise of its  
security due to environmental conditions or fluctuations outside  
of the module's normal operating ranges for voltage and  
15 temperature. Intentional excursions beyond the normal operating  
ranges could be used to thwart a module's defense during an  
attack. A module is required to either include special  
environmental protection features designed to detect fluctuations  
or to undergo rigorous environmental failure testing that  
20 provides a reasonable assurance that the module will not be  
affected by fluctuations outside of the normal operating range  
in a manner that can compromise the security of the module.

The cryptographic modules are capable of being used in a  
multi-node server based environment. When the transaction server  
25 receives a request that requires module services, it gathers all  
data required to perform the service and inputs it to a module  
as part of a module command. Depending on the service requested,  
the module may generate outputs such as a message to the provider  
infrastructure, a message to the client, or an updated PSD  
30 package to be stored by the database server. The transaction  
server acts on these module outputs to continue the transaction  
sequence by relaying messages to the provider, the client, or the  
database. Although the server directs the system's operation,  
the modules and other cryptographic elements of the system

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1 maintain the integrity of data flowing through the system without  
relying on the server's software.

Each of the cryptographic modules of the present invention  
is capable of performing Key management, whether the module  
5 implements a secret key (symmetric) algorithm or a public key  
(asymmetric) algorithm. Secret keys and private keys are  
protected from unauthorized disclosure, modification or  
substitution. Public keys are protected against unauthorized  
modification or substitution. Detailed key management  
10 requirements are defined in FIPS 140-1, the contents of which is  
incorporated by reference herein. Cryptographic key management  
is typically concerned with the entire life cycle of the  
cryptographic keys employed within a cryptographic-based security  
system, including their generation, distribution, entry, use,  
15 storage, archiving and destruction.

FIPS 140-1 allows key generation for a cryptographic module  
to be done either inside the module or outside the module and  
then loaded into the module. Because the postage server uses  
many identical modules to perform the PSD functions, certain keys  
20 are generated and distributed to the other identical modules.  
All keys are generated using FIPS approved key generation  
algorithms, for example the following FIPS approved Standards,  
the contents of which are hereby incorporated by reference  
herein.

25 FIPS PUB 46-2: Data Encryption Standard (DES)  
FIPS PUB 46-3: Requirements for 3DES  
FIPS PUB 112: Password Usage  
FIPS PUB180-1: Secure Hash Standard (SHA-1)  
FIPS PUB 186: Digital Signature Standard  
30 ANSI X9.52-1998 Triple Data Encryption Algorithm Modes of  
Operation  
PKCS#1:RSA (1024 bits)  
PKCS#3: Anonymous Diffie-Hellman.

Each module provides key management support for keys that  
35 are used for user data protection. The module is used for the

1 management of a large number of postage meters. Presumably, this  
number may be too large for (permanent) storage inside the  
modules. Therefore, all data pertaining to postage meters is  
stored external to the modules. This necessitates security  
5 mechanisms guarded by the module to maintain authenticity and  
confidentiality of this meter data. In addition, load balancing  
requires the sharing of the load between multiple modules.  
Finally, it is not feasible to predict which module will be  
processing a certain meter. This leads to the following  
10 features:

- Each module supports confidentiality (encryption) and authentication of user data sets when stored outside the module. These keys used for this are called the Master Encryption Key (MEK) and the Master Authentication Key (MAK), respectively.  
15
- Each module supports encryption and authentication of the key token format: DES (sccDES\_Key\_t), DSA (sccDSAKeyToken\_t) and RSA (sccRSAKeyToken\_t), and preferably also generic support for arbitrary-length key data buffers.
- 20 • Each module supports generation of Master Keys (MEK and MAK) using the module's hardware-based RNG. Encryption meets FIPS 46-3 requirements for 3DES.
- Each module provides a backup strategy for Master Keys that maintains security with guaranteed availability under all reasonable circumstances.  
25
- Each module supports activation and de-activation of Master Keys.
- Each module supports rollover from one Master Key Set (MEK and MAK) to another set. This implies support for two  
30 Master Key Sets, a active one, and a dormant one. In addition, each module provides translation of data protected under one of these sets to protection under the other set.
- Each module supports deletion of a (dormant) MKS. This is  
35 required in case of compromise of an MKS.

1       Decryption of the data set and verification of its  
authenticity by another module different than the one that  
created the encrypted data set is also possible. This implies  
the requirement of sharing (cloning) of the decryption and  
5       authentication keys between modules.

- Export of a Master Key Set (MKS) to another module.
- Import of an MKS from another module.
- Export and Import of an MKS is encrypted and authenticated.
- Import and export is under dual control; at least 3 users  
10       should be involved.
- The module that exports an MKS determines whether this MKS  
is exportable from the importing module.

A MKS is generated in the master module. The master module  
can export an MKS to other modules, in shares, each encrypted  
15       under the destination module's Transport Public Key. This  
process requires prior export of the Transport Public Key from  
the destination module by a Key Custodian, and provision of that  
key to the master as an input parameter to the Export Share  
command. The generation of the Transport Key Pair is done in  
20       Initializing state; this command transitions to Importing Shares  
state. The export of the Transport Public Key is done in  
Operational or Importing Shares state; the actual import of the  
MKS is preferably done in Importing Shares state.

The Transport Private Key is a retained key; it can not be  
25       exported outside the module it was generated in. This ensures  
that export of an MKS always is destined for one well-determined  
module. Generation of a Transport Key Pair only in Initializing  
state ensures that a module has only one Transport Key Pair in  
its lifetime; a Reset is required to return to Initializing  
30       state. Moreover, transition from Initializing to Importing  
Shares state upon generation of the Transport Key means that any  
module should have an MKS when in Operational state.

A MKS can be exported as an exportable MKS or as a retained  
MKS. This is a property of the exported key itself; the  
35       destination module respects this distinction. An exportable MKS

1 can be exported in the same way as the master exports its  
internally generated key. A retained key cannot be exported  
(attempted export of a retained MKS will fail). This  
architecture allows for limitation of the number of modules with  
5 an exportable MKS. Unless all of these modules have to be reset,  
one can always create additional modules with the same MKS. At  
the same time, there can be fairly tight control over the (few)  
modules with an exportable MKS.

In case all exportable copies of an MKS are lost (all  
10 modules containing an exportable copy are reset or lost) one can  
still continue processing with any modules that are still  
operational. Next, one can create a new MKS (possibly in a new  
master) and export that to all operational modules. These  
modules then can roll over to the new key. Subsequently, one can  
15 add new modules with this new MKS, like before.

Preferably, all operational modules can be brought back to  
operational state with the proper MKS as long as at least one  
exportable copy of this MKS exists. If all exportable copies are  
lost, one could just continue operating with any remaining  
20 operational copies, generate a new MKS in the master (possibly  
a new module) and roll over to that new MKS in the operational  
modules. Subsequently, one can create new modules with that MKS,  
just like before.

This implies that no special backup procedures are required;  
25 the cloning procedures and the fact that all exportable copies  
of an MKS act as each other's backup copy are sufficient to  
maintain availability under all circumstances that can reasonably  
expected to occur.

To maximize the probability that at least one exportable  
30 copy of the MKS is always available, an additional MKS backup  
copy can be created by reserving a separate (non-operational)  
module for its storage. To avoid existence of an operational  
module without attendance, the import of the MKS is preferably  
only done when the backup copy is needed. Preferably, the export  
35 is done in an  $n$ -out-of- $m$ - secret sharing scheme (Shamir).

1        In the descriptions below for losing keys, the backup shares together with the backup module are considered to constitute an exportable MKS. Note that the backup module use requires prior import of  $n$  of the  $m$  shares.

5        If no exportable copies of the MKS are lost, no capabilities are lost, just operational capacity (bandwidth). This allows a quick return to full capacity in case a module is lost (see below), as well as increase of capacity, since the MKS can be exported to a new module.

10       The recovery procedure is repeated for each of the modules that have lost the MKS.

For a new module or if the transport key is also lost:  
reset (or replace) the operational module and generate a new Transport Key Pair in Initializing state;  
15       export the Transport Public Key from the destination module;  
export encrypted shares of the MKS (for this Transport Public Key) from the source module;  
import the encrypted MKS to the destination module;  
20       activate the MKS in the destination module.

If some (but not all) exportable copies of the MKS are lost, the remaining copies can still export, therefore, no capabilities are lost. (Some capacity may be lost) This allows a quick return to full capacity by restoring the MKS in all modules that  
25       lost it (or in their replacement).

If the only remaining exportable MKS is the backup copy, first import  $n$  of the backup shares into the backup module. This module now is a normal module with an exportable MKS, so the remainder of the procedure is the same as described above. In  
30       this case, all operational modules can continue operating with the current MKS. The only capability lost in this case is export of the MKS, and therefore the addition of new modules.

The Recovery procedure is as follow:

Reset (or replace) the master;

35       Generate a new MKS in Initializing state;

1       For each module that is still operational:

          Import this module's Transport Public Key;

          Export the new MKS from the new master, encrypted

          under this Transport Public Key. If the destination

5       module contains a retained copy of the old MKS, the

          exported MKS should be a retained copy, else it may be

          an exportable MKS;

          Import the new MKS into the operational module;

          Translate the protection of all data from the old MKS to

10       the new MKS;

          Activate the new MKS in each of the operational modules.

          This returns the system to a state equivalent to that before

          loss of all exportable copies of the MKS. In particular, new

          capacity can now be added again. However, during this recovery,

15       the system has a reduced capacity (only modules that are still

          operational are running).

          All keys involved in session key management (ephemeral DH

          keys, session master keys and transaction keys) are maintained

          by session management (described below). Local keys are used for

20       encryption of sensitive data stored in persistent memory, to

          avoid exposure in case of tampering. One mechanism chosen for

          this is the PPD read/write mechanism for the memory (sccSavePPD

          and sccGetPPD) where the encryption keys are stored in NVM (which

          is cleared on tamper). The key management is internal to the

25       module.

          Key management services related to cloning and management

          of the MKS include:

- The Key Management Services module interface function
- Generate MKS
- 30      •       Generate Transport Public Key (TPK)
- Export Transport Public Key
- Create MKS Shares
- Export MKS Share
- Leave Exporting Shares state

35

- 1       •     Start Importing MKS (transition to Importing Shares state)
- Import MKS Share
- Combine MKS Shares
- 5       •     Activate MKS (deactivates old MKS, if any, and activates a new one)
- Delete the dormant MKS
- Encryption and/or MAC Translation (decrypt and verify MAC under old MKS; compute MAC and re-encrypt under new MKS)

Usage of the MKS include:

- Compute MAC and Encrypt
- Decrypt and verify MAC
- Compute MAC
- 15       •     Verify MAC

The following two keys are generated by a module when the start initialization command is executed. These keys are not shared with other modules.

- ASK, audit signing key. This is a 1024-bit DSA key used to sign entries in an audit log.
- 20       •     Audit Verification Public Key. This key is output from the module and will be used to authenticate the audit record log.

The following two keys are generated by a Master cryptographic module when the MKS command is executed.

- 25       •     MEK, the master encrypting key. This is a triple-DES key used by the module to encrypt all external key tokens for keys that are generated by the modules.
- MAK, the master authentication key. This is preferably an 8-byte key used to generate a DES MAC for key tokens encrypted by the MEK.
- 30       •

The following two keys are generated by the modules that are not Masters when the generated transport key command is executed.

- 35       •     V\_TPK, Transport Private Key. This is an RSA key used by a non-master module to decrypt the imported MKS key.



- 1     •     U\_TPK, Transport Public Key. This is an RSA key used by a master module to encrypt an MKS key that will be distributed to another module.

5     The module's system software (CP/Q++) generates the following key during CP/Q++ initialization.

- PPD key. This is a DESkey generated by the CP/Q++ and used to encrypt keys that are stored in the module's flash memory. The key is not accessible outside the system software.

10    The module generates the following keys for use during secure sessions with the host computer.

- Session Master Keys. This is a set of two keys, generated for a given secure session, used to derive session transaction keys. One key is for authentication (DES MAC computation) and the other for security (Triple-DES encryption). The keys are destroyed at the conclusion of the secure session.

- Session Transaction Keys. These keys are used for a single transaction during a secure session. They are derived by a one-way function of the Session Master Keys combined with a transaction counter.

20    The following five keys are generated by a module when the initialize crypto-card command is executed.

- VDSK\_ipost, the DSA private key used by the modules to sign challenges during client registration. The key is output in a key token for distribution to other modules.
  - UDSK\_ipost, the DSA public key that is imbedded in the client application software and is used to authenticate challenges signed by the module during client registration.
- 30    The key is output from the module after generation.
- VRSK\_ipost, the RSA private key used by the modules to decrypt client secrets transmitted to the modules during client registration. The key is output in a key token for distribution to other modules.

35

- 1 • URSK\_ipost, the RSA public key that is imbedded in the client application software and is used to encrypt client secrets transmitted to the module during client registration. The key is output from the module after generation.
- 5 • MK\_chkpt, the DES MAC key used to authenticate a checkpoint database record when it is returned to a module from the database. This key is derived from VDSK\_ipost by hashing it using SHA-1 each time that VDSK\_ipost is imported by the module.
- 10

The following keys are generated by a module at the time that a PSD package, the database record containing a postage meter's data, is created.

- 15 • V\_psd, the DSA private key used to sign indicia created by this VBI meter. This key is stored in the meter's PSD package as a key token, encrypted by the MEK.
- U\_psd, the DSA public key used to authenticate the signature on indicia created by this VBI meter. This key is output from the module to the provider after generation.
- 20 • MK\_psd, the DES MAC key used to authenticate a PSD package when it is returned to a module from the database. This key is derived from V\_psd by hashing it using SHA-1 each time that V\_psd is imported by the module.
- EDEK\_psd, the 3DES key-encrypting-key used to encrypt the client secrets transmitted to the module during client registration. This key is stored in the client's PSD package as a key token, encrypted by the MEK.
- 25

FIPS 140-1 allows key distribution to be performed by manual methods, automated methods, or a combination of automated and manual methods. Keys are input to a module when required to initialize the module and to initialize the PSD packages of each meter. These key transfers are not considered key distribution. Also, FIPS 140-1 allows key entry and output procedures to differ depending upon the key distribution technique employed. The cryptographic module does not implement manual key entry. All

1 secret or private keys are input to or output from the module electronically and are encrypted.

The system of the present invention utilizes a plurality of cryptographic modules that need to work in concert. This entails  
5 creating a shared secret for all the modules. In one embodiment, key entry is required to initialize a new clone module for service at the service provider's facility. Preferably, only one module functions as a master module. The master module generate a Master Key Set (MKS). The exporting of the shares of the MKS  
10 keys requires dual control. The Security Officer should first issue a create MKS shares command to specify the number of shares to be created and to authorize the export of the shares.

In one embodiment, the module uses a Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PNRG) to generate the MKS, which contains two distinct  
15 keys:

1. Master Encryption Key (MEK): A 3DES key used to encrypt keys when stored outside the module.
2. Master Authentication Key (MAK): This is a key used to compute the DES MAC for signing keys when stored outside of  
20 the module.

The MKS is stored in a non-volatile memory (NVM) within the module.

When the required number of shares are input to a module, a Key Management Officer can then enter an export share command  
25 to export one of the MKS shares. Input as part of the export share command is the transport public key of the new module being cloned. This public key is used to encrypt each key share before it is exported and stored on a storage medium such as a floppy disk, a CDROM, or the like. After the last share is exported,  
30 the Master module returns to the operational state and will no longer output key shares.

For the modules that are not masters, the Security Officer uses the generate transport key command to request the module to generate the transport key pair. This command also establishes  
35 that the module is not a master module. The transport public key

1 is output for use by a Key Management Officer when exporting MKS  
key shares from a Master module. To input MKS shares to a  
module, the Security Officer must send the start importing shares  
command to the destination module. Key Management Officers can  
5 then enter their shares from their floppy disks, CDROMs, or the  
like until all have been entered. The destination module uses  
its transport private key to decrypt the key shares. The process  
is completed when the Security Officer sends the combine shares  
command.

10 The MKS is used to generate external key tokens by MACing  
the key with the MAK and Triple-DES encrypting it with the MEK.  
After a new module has been loaded with the MKS, the Security  
Officer can use the initialize crypto-card command to export key  
tokens from the module or to load it with key tokens generated  
15 by another module.

In one embodiment for secure printing of postage values, the  
following four keys are input to a module using the initialize  
crypto-card command.

- VDSK\_ipost, the DSA private key used by modules to sign  
20 challenges during client registration.
- VRSK\_ipost, the RSA private key used by modules to decrypt  
client secrets transmitted to the module during client  
registration.
- U\_ca, the USPS Certificate Authority's X.509 certificate.
- 25 • UDSK\_auth, the DSA public key used to authenticate  
signatures on messages from the provider infrastructure.

At the time of customer registration, the key URSK\_ipost,  
embedded in the client computer cryptographic software is used  
to encrypt client secrets before transmitting them to the module.

30 These secrets include:

- HMK, the client's MACing key. The key is used to generate  
a DES MAC for mutual authentication of messages between the  
client and the module.

35

- 1     •     PW, the hash of the customer's passphrase. The hash of the  
passphrase is used to authenticate the customer to the  
module if the client's copy of HMK is lost.

5     The module uses the private key VRSK-ipost to decrypt these  
client secrets before storing them as an encrypted key token in  
the meter's PSD package.

10    Within the module, the permanently stored secret keys are  
stored in designated NVM locations that serve to adequately  
identify their function. Secret and private keys that are stored  
outside the module as part of a PSD package are contained in key  
tokens. Key tokens are data structures that identify the keys  
and include other information relevant to the keys. The key  
tokens are authenticated by the MAK and encrypted by the MEK.  
When these keys are inside the module they are stored in  
15    designated locations in volatile memory.

20    The cryptographic module of the present invention provides  
the capability to zeroize all plaintext cryptographic keys and  
other unprotected critical security parameters within the module.  
For example, the IBM 4758 stores all plain text keys and other  
SRDI's in BBRAM (NVM). Zeroization of all BBRAM contents occurs  
if the module's tamper detection envelope senses intrusion. A  
system user can also destroy these SRID's by disconnecting the  
external batteries that provide backup power to the module.  
These features allow the 4758 to meet FIPS 140-1 requirements.  
25    FIPS 140-1 allows for a cryptographic module to output encrypted  
keys for archiving purposes. In one embodiment, each module  
implements key archiving mechanisms.

30    A state machine determines the availability of module  
commands in conjunction with the roles that a user takes up. In  
other words, the state and the current user role together provide  
sufficient information to decide whether an action is allowed or  
not. Most commands require authentication for transport from the  
host to the module. Therefore, an active session is derived  
requirement for execution of these commands. This requirement  
35    is explicitly verified by these commands, however.

1 Invalid data may lead to failure of execution. However,  
verification of validity is considered the first step in  
execution. The decision to start execution depends on the state  
and the user role alone; validity of input data does not play a  
5 role in that decision. The complete module state or the state  
of any module application may be composed of the module state as  
described in this document, complemented with other state  
information maintained by other libraries. Exemplary states are  
described below.

10 Uninitialized state. This is the initial, state that the  
module is in immediately after loading the code and  
booting. No security related data has been loaded. The  
only available command is the Start Initializing command.  
Initializing state is the state that the module is in  
15 during the initialization process. In this state, the  
access control database is initialized and the MKS is  
generated or its import is initiated. The module exits  
this state when an MKS is generated (next state:  
operational) or when a Transport Key Pair is generated  
20 (next state: importing shares).

Operational state. In this state, all normal operational  
commands can be executed. Depending on the user role(s)  
these can be administrative (change password), postage  
meter related, session management or auditing commands. In  
25 addition, certain key management commands (activation of a  
new MKS and deletion of a dormant MKS) are available.  
Finally, special commands transition to other states  
(administrative, exporting shares, importing shares) for  
special restricted commands.

30 Administrative state. This state includes all access  
control maintenance commands, such as adding, deleting,  
viewing and modifying user accounts. The module enters  
this state from Operational state when a Security Officer  
issues the Begin Admin command in operational state. It  
35

1 remains in this state until the Security Officer issues the  
End Admin command (next state: operational).

Exporting Shares state. This state allows the Key  
Custodians to export shares of the MKS. The module enters  
5 this state from operational state when a Security Officer  
issues the Create MKS Shares command. It remains in this  
state until all shares have been exported (via the Export  
MKS Share command) or the Abort Export command is issued  
(in both cases, the next state is operational). If the  
10 Abort Export command is issued before all shares are  
exported, the exported shares may be useless.

Importing Shares state. This state accepts the import of  
shares of the MKS. The module enters this state from  
operational state when a Security Officer issues a Start  
15 Importing MKS command. It remains in this state until a  
Combine Shares command is issued (next state: operational  
if an MKS exists after completion, else error).

Error state The coprocessor enters this state on (fatal)  
errors. Depending on the severity of the error, it should  
20 be cleared by rebooting, or the coprocessor should be reset  
(next state: uninitialized). Only audit entry creation and  
session commands are possible in this state.

FIG. 6 illustrates an exemplary finite state machine. The  
logon and logoff functions, session management commands, access  
25 control queries, and audit entry creation are available in all  
states except uninitialized and error.

Within any thread in the module, it is not possible to  
interrupt processing, and to resume processing at another  
instruction than where it was interrupted. The only exception  
30 to this rule is rebooting. Rebooting interrupts processing, and  
starta at a given fixed location in the application.

In one embodiment, two variables hold the current state  
information: Current State and Persistent State. The latter is  
stored in NVM. This allows for atomic state transitions and for  
35 retaining state information across rebooting. Atomic state

1 transitions can be implemented by first updating Current State,  
then performing all required actions, and finally updating  
Persistent State. If the module is rebooted during this  
sequence, the old state is retained in Persistent State. Thus,  
5 if Persistent State has been updated, one is assured that the  
full transaction has been executed. In addition, it can be used  
to retain Error state information as required.

Before executing any function, the module verifies whether  
a reboot has occurred by checking a boot detection flag in the  
10 NVM. A reboot clears NVM, thus also clearing this flag.  
Therefore, the first call to the module after a boot will find  
this flag cleared. After performing any required initialization,  
the flag can be set.

Initialization includes the following boot detection. When  
15 the reboot flag is found set, no action is taken. When the  
reboot flag is found cleared, the value of the Persistent State  
variable is examined, and the following is done.

If it is Error: a fatal error has occurred, and Current  
State is set to Error.

20 If it is Initializing: Persistent and Current State are set  
to Error, as this is a fatal error.

If it is Importing Shares, and if there is no active MKS,  
Persistent and Current State are set to Error, as this is  
a fatal error. (If the module contains a valid active MKS,  
25 both Current State and Persistent State are set to  
Operational, see below.)

If it is Exporting Shares: Current State is set to Error,  
as this is a non-fatal error.

If it is Uninitialized: no successful initialization has  
30 been performed and Current State is set to Uninitialized.  
If it is Importing Shares, and if the module contains a  
valid active MKS, both Current State and Persistent State  
are set to Operational.

Else: both Current State and Persistent State are set to  
35 Operational.



1 Unless specified otherwise, all state transitions mentioned  
in this document are performed by first updating Current State,  
and then updating Persistent State. Atomic actions are enclosed  
within such a state transition.

5 The module is in Uninitialized state immediately after  
loading all software and booting. In the Uninitialized state,  
no commands can be accepted, except the "Start Initialization"  
command. This command erases all non-volatile memory. This  
erases all data and keys present in the module, in particular the  
10 Master Keys and the access control database; set the internal  
module clock; creates the Audit Signing Key; creates the first  
audit entry, capturing this event; and transitions to the  
Initializing state.

15 Preferably, the only way to return to Uninitialized state  
is to reset the module. This together with the fact that  
initialization always erases all data, ensures no data survives  
a reset. The Uninitialized state serves as a shield to make sure  
no transitions to Initializing state are possible from other  
states without losing all data and keys.

20 The Initializing state contains those commands that are to  
be executed once in the lifetime of a module. The only way to  
enter Initializing state is by issuing the "Start Initialization"  
command from the Uninitialized state. This ensures that upon  
entry to the Initializing state, no data or keys are retained.  
25 Here, the module is in an entirely clean state. In Initializing  
state, the following actions/commands are allowed:

- Get Status
- Initialize Access control database
- Logon
- 30 • Logoff
- Query Current User Role
- Query Current User ID
- All Session Management commands
- Audit entry creation
- 35 • Generate Master Key Set

- 1           •     Generate Transport Key Pair.

          The last two commands represent the only means to establish a Master Key Set (MKS) in a module. A module can either generate a Master Key Set (MKS) itself, or it can import one and encrypt it under its own Transport Public Key (TPK). These two commands perform the generation respectively and prepare the import (by generating the import encryption key pair). In summary, the Initializing state serves to initialize the module and the sharing of the MKS. These initializations are one-time activities; the former mainly because there is no need to repeat it; the latter because it is not allowed to happen repeatedly.

          All normal, operational commands are executed in Operational state. That is, Operational state contains commands implementing all actions not related to initialization of a module, the maintenance of the access control database, or key management (with the exception of key usage). The following are examples of commands in Operational state associated with different functions.

- Access Control
  - 20           Begin Admin (transition to Administrative state).
  - Logon
  - Logoff
  - Query Current User Role
  - Query Current User ID
  - 25           View Access control database
  - Change password
  - Set clock
  - Get Status
- Session Management
  - 30           Open Session
  - Close Session
  - Compute Session MAC
  - Verify Session MAC
  - Session Encrypt
  - 35           Session Decrypt

- 1     •     Key Management
- Key management related to cloning and management of the MKS:
- Export Transport Public Key
- 5           Start Importing MKS (transition to Importing Shares state)
- Create MKS Shares (transition to Exporting Shares state)
- Generate MKS
- 10          Activate MKS (deactivates old MKS, if any, and activates a new one)
- Delete dormant MKS
- Usage of the MKS:
- Global Encrypt and MAC
- 15          Global Decrypt and MAC
- Compute MAC
- Verify MAC
- MKS Rollover:
- Encryption and MAC Translation (decrypt and verify MAC under old MKS; compute MAC and re-encrypt under new MKS)
- 20
- Audit Support
- Audit Entry creation
- Audit Key Creation
- 25          Export of the Audit Verification Key
- All administrative commands supporting access control are executed in Administrative state. That is, Administrative state contains commands implementing:
- Creation of an account
- 30          •     Deletion of an account
- Modification of an account
- Viewing the access control database. This command lists all users and their roles, account expiration, last access, but not the user passwords.
- 35          •     End Admin (transition back to Operational state).

- 1           •     Logon
- Logoff
- Query Current User Role
- Query Current User ID
- 5           •     Set clock
- Get Status
- All session management commands
- Audit entry creation.

10        Preferably, all these commands (except session key usage) are audited.

15        As shown in FIG. 6, Administrative state is entered by the Start Admin command, issued by a Security Officer. The administrative commands in Administrative state require Administrator user role. This separation of roles ensures dual control. Secondly, the transition to administrative state will ensure that no operational commands can be issued by the Administrator (separation of duties).

20        The Exporting Shares state exports encrypted shares of a Master Key Set. When the last share in a secret sharing scheme is exported, the module transitions to operational state. All these commands are audited. (Audit entry creation.) Only an exportable MKS can be exported this way (i.e., internally generated or imported as exportable; by default an imported MKS is a retained key). The export is initiated by a Security Officer issuing the Create MKS Shares command in Operational state. This command changes state to Exporting Shares. The actual export of the encrypted shares is done through the Export Share command, issued by a Key Custodian. Encryption of the shares is under the Transport Public Key. This key is provided by the Key Custodian as an input parameter to the Export Shares command. Rebooting while in Exporting Shares state may be a fatal error.

30        The following commands are available in the Exporting Shares state.

- 35           •     Logon

- 1           •     Logoff
- Query Current User Role
- Query Current User ID
- Export Share
- 5           •     Abort Export
- Get Status
- All Session Management commands
- Audit entry creation.

10       In the Importing Shares state, a module imports encrypted shares of an MKS. The encryption is done under the Transport Key. Importing shares state is entered by Issuing the Start Importing MKS command. The actual import is performed by repeating the Import Share command as required. Combination of the shares to a MKS transitions to Operational state is also possible. All these commands are audited. (Audit entry creation.

The following commands are available in the Importing Shares state.

- 20          •     Logon
- Logoff
- Query Current User Role
- Query Current User ID
- Export Transport Public Key
- Import Share
- 25          •     Combine Shares
- Get Status
- All Session Management commands
- Audit entry creation.

30       In Error state, no cryptographic operations may be performed. Thus, the only commands available in the Error state are Get Status, Access Control Queries. A reset erases all NVM and changes to Uninitialized state. Fatal errors set both Persistent State and Current State to Error. This ensures that rebooting will not clear the error. Therefore, the only way to clear fatal errors is a Reset command, or by a complete re-

1 initialization of the module by other means (both methods change  
state to Uninitialized). Non-fatal errors only set Current State  
to Error; the Persistent State is not modified. A subsequent  
5 reboot clears the error, unless a boot error occurs. All Module  
command requests in Error state, with the exception of Get  
Status, return an error and do not output any data. Error states  
are preferably non-fatal, with the following exceptions (i.e.  
these only set Current State to Error):

10 failure in Audit Entry Creation which doesn't breaks the  
audit chain; and  
detection of Exporting Shares state during boot-up

Throughout the lifecycle of a module, its software keeps  
track of the module's present operational state and allows only  
the operations that are allowed for these module states. Each  
15 PSD package also contains information to define its present  
operational state. When the module is loaded with a PSD's  
package, module software will only perform operations that are  
allowed for the present state of that PSD. The following  
paragraphs describe the states of the module and the PSD package  
20 throughout their operating life.

When the module is first operated after its software is  
loaded, it starts in the uninitialized state. Preferably, the  
only command that it will accept is the start initialization  
command and the start initialization command will only be  
25 executed if the module is in the uninitialized state. During  
this phase of life, the Module is not considered to be a crypto  
module and no authentication is required to issue this command.  
The start initialization command first erases all non-volatile  
memory to destroy any cryptographic keys or access account  
30 database entries that may persist from previous use of the  
module. When memory erasure is completed, the module transitions  
to the initializing state.

The Initialized state includes commands that can be executed  
only once in the life of the module. Because this state can only  
35 be entered from the uninitialized state, an existing module

1 cannot be modified by using these commands. Within this state  
the access account database is initialized. If a master module  
is being created, the master key set (MKS) is generated and the  
operational state is entered. If the module is not a master, the  
5 transport key pair is generated and the Importing shares state  
is entered.

Preferably, the module Exporting Shares state can only be  
entered from the Operational state. Once the master module  
generates the MKS it can export it to another module. In one  
10 embodiment, this is accomplished by using an n of m Shamir secret  
sharing technique, as follows:

1. A target (clone) module is initialized, following the  
steps described above.
- 15 2. The Security Officer logs on to the newly initialized  
target Module and issues a command to generate a transport  
key pair (TPK). The TPK is a RSA public key used for  
transporting an MKS previously generated by the master  
module. The private portion of the TPK is retained in the  
new module and can never be exported from the module that  
20 generated it. This control ensures that MKS export is  
always destined for one well-determined target module. The  
public portion of the TPK is saved on to a floppy disk, a  
CDROM, or the like.
- 25 3. The public portion of the TPK is saved onto a storage  
medium such as a floppy, CDROM, or the like and physically  
carried over to the machine housing the master module. The  
Security Officer logs on to the master module and issues  
the create MKS shares command. The create MKS shares  
command accepts two arguments: (1) the number of shares to  
30 be created (n, one share per key custodian) and (2) the  
threshold number of shares required to recombine the  
shares. A successful create MKS command results in n  
number of shares, where n is greater than or equal to 2.
- 35 4. A Key Custodian logs in and initiates the export MKS  
shares command on the master Module and chooses whether the

1       exported key pair should be an exportable or retained key  
pair for the destination module. An exportable key pair  
permits the destination module to export key shares in the  
same manner as the original master module. With a retained  
5       key pair, the new cloned module cannot export key shares to  
other cryptographic modules. The export MKS shares command  
validates the current key custodian and then encrypts an  
MKS share with the TPK. The TPK-encrypted share is saved  
to a floppy, a CDROM, or the like. This procedure is  
10       repeated for each key custodian specified in step 3, above.

The module Importing Shares State can be entered from the  
Initializing state (to load the MKS for the first time) or from  
the Operational state (to load a replacement MKS). The following  
describe in more detail the importation of the MKS key shares for  
15       generation of the master key set in a module. Once the master  
Module encrypts the MKS shares and saves them to floppies, the  
shares can be imported into the target module.

1. The Security Officer logs into the target module and  
initiates the start importing MKS shares command.
- 20       2. The first Key Custodian inserts their MKS share floppy  
or CDROM, logs in, and issues the import MKS share command.  
The target module reads in the first share. This procedure  
is repeated for each Key Custodian.

When the final Key Custodian has finished entering the key  
25       share, the Security Officer logs in and issues the combine MKS  
shares command. The combine MKS shares command causes the target  
module to unencrypt each share and combine them to create the  
MKS. The shares are destroyed following this procedure. The MKS  
is stored in the NVM as described above.

30       Once in the Operational state, the module is capable of  
completing its remaining initialization steps. The security  
officer sends an initialize crypto-card command to load all other  
required module shared keys (These are described in the Key  
Management section). The administrator can enter the access  
35



1 control data for all other personnel that require authenticated  
role access to the module.

When the module is initialized, it does not become a PSD  
until PSD packages are created. A PSD package is created using  
5 the initialize PSD command. This creates a data structure that  
contains the PSD package data elements. One data element is the  
present state of the PSD. The module will only allow the PSD to  
perform operations that are allowed for its present state. When  
the initialize PSD process is completed, the PSD state changes  
10 to the raw state.

In one embodiment, the PSD package for each meter user  
contains all data needed to restore the meter's PSD to its last  
known state when it is next loaded into a module. This includes  
the items that the IBIP Performance Criteria specifies to be  
15 stored inside the PSD, information required to return the PSD to  
a valid state when the record is reloaded from the database, and  
data needed for record security and administrative purposes. In  
this embodiment, the PSD package includes the following items:

- Ascending and descending registers
- 20 • Device ID
- Indicia key certificate serial number
- Licensing ZIP code
- Key token for the indicia signing key
- The user secrets, (the client DES MAC key and the SHA-1  
25 hash of the client's passphrase).
- Key token for EDEK\_psd, the key for encrypting user secrets
- Data needed to maintain operating continuity includes:
- Date and time of the last PSD transaction
- The last challenge received from the client
- 30 • The operational state of the PSD (leased, withdrawn, etc.)
- Expiration dates for keys
- The passphrase repetition list (eliminates reuse of recent  
passphrases)

The IBIP Performance Criteria specifies that the PSD should  
35 store the public key certificate for the USPS CA. Because all

1     meters require this information, it serves no purpose to repeat  
this data in each PSD package. Instead, the certificate for the  
USPS CA public key is stored in the memory of all the modules.

The following describes the PSD package states.

- 5     •     Raw state. As a result of initialization the meter serial  
number is assigned, the postal registers are set to zero,  
the PSD keys are generated, and all other initializing  
steps are performed. The provider receives the PSD public  
key and device ID needed to obtain the PSD's public key  
10     certificate. Preferably, the only command that can be  
executed while in the raw state is the authorize PSD  
command.
- Unleased state. The authorize PSD command loads the PSD  
public key certificate and changes the PSD state from raw  
15     to the unleased state. Preferably, the only command that  
can be executed while in the unleased state is the  
configure PSD command.
- Assigned state. The configure PSD command assigns the PSD  
to a customer, allows entry of the customer shared secrets,  
20     and places the PSD in the assigned state . When the  
customer's postal license is issued, the authorize customer  
command enters the customer's originating zip code and  
places the PSD in the leased state.
- Leased state. Once in the leased state the PSD is ready  
25     for the customer to use. The meter can begin printing  
indicia once the first postage value download had been  
completed.
- Password Reset state. This is a temporary state to allow  
a lost password to be replaced.
- 30     •     Withdrawn state. The user's account has been closed or  
suspended. This state is entered from the leased state or  
pwreset state by executing the create refund indicium  
command. The PSD package remains in the database where it  
can be accessed by the server but after entering the

35

1 withdrawn state the Module will no longer execute any PSD  
command when loaded with this PSD package.

The PSD packages are stored outside the modules when not  
being used and the module is able to detect when record storage  
5 problems have occurred. In one embodiment, a Redundant Array of  
Independent Disks (RAID) and a database server are used together  
to provide reliable operation of the database. Multiple copies  
of each record are maintained and a locking system is used to  
prevent more than one postal server from simultaneously accessing  
10 one meter's PSD package. If a partial failure of the RAID  
occurs, the system transparently switches to backup records.

In one embodiment, the cryptographic modules store up to  
five transactions in a respective internal register. The number  
of transactions compared in the verification process system may  
15 be set by the system administrator. A verification process  
compares a predetermined number of last transactions. The  
database subsystem stores a table that preferably includes the  
module(s) present in the Postal Server subsystem, the module  
serial numbers, the time of the last transaction the module  
20 processed, the date of the last transaction the module processed  
and the value of the last transaction the cryptographic module  
processed. Other values related to a transaction and a module  
can also be saved for verification purposes. An example of the  
module table, where the Postal Server subsystem has four modules,  
25 is illustrated below.

Cryptographic module	Cryptographic module Serial. #	Transaction Time	Transaction Date	Transaction Value
1	34576590	11:53 PM	08/06/99	\$ 0.33
2	34582152	07:30 AM	08/05/99	\$ 7.55
3	34593104	03:00 PM	08/02/99	\$ 3.45
4	34593992	11:22 AM	08/03/99	\$ 5.78

35

1           When a cryptographic module loads a new PSD out of the  
Database subsystem (performing a transaction), the module's  
register, containing the last transaction's time, date and value,  
is verified against that module's entry in the Database  
5       subsystem's module table. The time, date or value for each  
transaction stored in each module should match the corresponding  
values for the respective module stored in the database for the  
verification process to be successfully completed. Cryptographic  
modules do not load new PSD transactions unless the verification  
10       process has been successfully completed. If any of the compared  
values is found to be different, preferably the whole system  
shuts down until authorized personnel can investigate the  
situation. In one embodiment, the threshold in the system is  
adjustable so that the system may be set to shut down if one, two  
15       or more modules fail the verification process.

          With the success of the authorization state, the client  
software not only trusts the cryptographic module, but also  
shares a common HMK with the cryptographic module, which it uses  
to sign and challenge each successive message. FIG. 5 is an  
20       exemplary embodiment illustrating client software and  
cryptographic module (PSD) communication during the operational  
state. Client software 503 sends a new challenge message to  
cryptographic module 502, as shown by 501. The cryptographic  
module responds by signing the challenge with the shared HMK and  
25       then sends this ciphertext back to the client software, along  
with its own challenge, as shown by 504. Client software 503  
compares the ciphertext of the challenge it originally sent to  
the cryptographic module, and also signs the message received  
from the cryptographic module.

30       If the signatures compare, the client software trusts the  
cryptographic module for this transaction. Client software 503  
uses the cryptographic module challenge message to authenticate  
itself to cryptographic module 502. Client software 503 now  
sends the signed challenge that cryptographic module 502 had

35

1 sent, with the addition of the client software local record of the user's AR and DR, as shown by 505.

The client software also sends a cleartext of the challenge and the transaction message, as shown by 506. Next, the client software sends a Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) for all of the data sent in 505 and 506, using shared HMK, as shown by 507. HMAC is a digital signature created using a hash algorithm with an arbitrary message and the secret key (HMK). The client software sends the original arbitrary message and the HMAC to Postal Server via the network. HMK, as the HMAC Key, stays in the client software 503. The cryptographic module 502 already has a copy of HMK because it was sent over to Postal Server during the user registration process. In another embodiment, Data Encryption Standard Message Authentication Code (DES MAC) is used instead of HMAC.

In one embodiment, the checkpoint concept operates in the following manner. Each module retains in its memory records relating to the three most recent transactions that modified a PSD package. For example, these records include the following data items:

- PSD meter ID
- Transaction type
- Transaction amount
- PSD AR value
- PSD DR value
- Module serial number
- Date/time stamp (for record replay detection)
- Module total amount reset
- Module total amount printed
- Module total amount refunded

The record of the most recent transaction is also output to the database and is protected from modification by a DES MAC generated using the key HMK\_chkpt. When a PSD transaction is to be performed, the checkpoint record from the database is input along with the PSD package for the meter. Preferably, all IBIP

1 commands to the modules are handled by the function sdx\_dispatch.  
Within dispatch, the checkpoint record from the database is  
compared with the most recent checkpoint record stored in the  
module memory. If they match, it is highly likely that no  
5 switchover of the database (resulting in lost records) has  
occurred. The module then trusts that the PSD package is up to  
date and allows the IBIP command to be executed. When the IBIP  
command is completed, the checkpoint record is updated and output  
to the server for database storage along with the updated PSD  
10 package.

In the case of create indicium commands, the server first  
confirms that the updated records have been stored on the  
database before the indicium is transmitted to the client for  
printing. (Server transaction logs keep a record of all messages  
15 sent to clients.) In the case of the provider commanding postage  
value download or create refund indicium, the server reports an  
error if the database fails to correctly store the updated  
checkpoint record and PSD package.

If the comparison of internal and external checkpoint  
20 records does not match, the module will not execute the IBIP  
command and an error code is returned to the server. The server  
then sends a command called "Auto-Recover module Checkpoint" to  
the module. This command allows a controlled rollback to an  
older checkpoint if the external checkpoint record matches either  
25 of the two older checkpoint records stored in the module internal  
memory. The module updates its internal records using data from  
the accepted checkpoint and outputs audit log records to document  
the more recent PSD transactions that are to be discarded  
(transactions more recent than the accepted checkpoint). If none  
30 of the module's internal checkpoint records match the record  
input from the database, auto-recovery fails and an error is  
returned to the server. This module is now effectively inhibited  
from processing PSD packages and operator intervention, using the  
disaster recovery process, is needed to return it to operation.

35

1           In summary, the checkpoint validation and auto-recovery  
processes allows the module to verify that the database providing  
records is up to date and to automatically resynchronize the  
module with the database if possible.

5           An Audit Log Verification protects PSD Package Replay. Use  
of a DES MEC to authenticate a PSD package ensures that the  
record originated from a module with knowledge of the client's  
package DES MAC key. The DES MAC verifies that the data within  
the record has not been modified since the DES MAC was generated.  
10          But because the DES MAC cannot ensure that the record is the most  
recent update of the client's data, other safeguards need to be  
used to prevent or detect substitution of a record created at an  
earlier time. The module addresses this problem by creating a  
cryptographically protected audit log entry each time a PSD  
15          package is modified by a module. The command  
scaaeCreateAuditEntry is used to create the audit record. An  
Audit Log Verification protects PSD Package Replay. Use of a DES  
MEC to authenticate a PSD package ensures that the record  
originated from a module with knowledge of the client's package  
20          DES MAC key. The DES MAC verifies that the data within the  
record has not been modified since the DES MAC was generated.  
But because the DES MAC cannot ensure that the record is the most  
recent update of the client's data, other safeguards need to be  
used to prevent or detect substitution of a record created at an  
25          earlier time. The module addresses this problem by creating a  
cryptographically protected audit log entry each time a PSD  
package is modified by a module. The command  
scaaeCreateAuditEntry is used to create the audit record.

30          The initialize cryptocard or update cryptocard commands  
perform the initializations. Limits are set for the minimum and  
maximum value of indicium that can be printed. The USPS  
certificate authority public key certificate is loaded. The  
provider public key is loaded. Private keys used during new  
customer registration are loaded. These commands are issued by  
35          the Security Officer.

1       The initialize PSD command assigns the device ID, set the postal registers to zero and generates the PSD public keys. This command is not authenticated but can only be executed once in the life of a PSD.

5       The authorize PSD command loads the PSD's public key certificate. The PSD's certificate is authenticated by the CA certificate, and the device ID and public key from the certificate are verified to match those contained in the PSD package.

10       The configure PSD command enters the new customer's customer ID and receives the encrypted secrets from the customer. The module decrypts the secrets using VRSK\_ipost. Preferably, this command is not authenticated but the response returned to the customer is DES MAC'ed by the module with the CDSK\_client key just received. The customer PC software verifies this DES MAC to ensure that the module has received the CDSK\_client key correctly.

15       The authorize customer command enters the originating zip code after the server receives the meter license and then the maximum descending register limit is set. This command is authenticated as a provider role command from the provider's signature using the key UDSK\_auth.

20       As described above, the cryptographic modules use roles and services to control access to the module and to specify which services (commands) are available to the user. Services of concern are those that access security parameters or postal financial data protected by the module. Each module supports many roles. In one embodiment, access control is accomplished as follows.

25       Authentication may be accomplished by using a secure session. For example, the roles of Security Officer, Key Custodian, Administrator, and Auditor are authenticated after a secure session between the user's PC and the module has been established. When the user issues an scasmOpenSession command,  
30       application software on the user's PC and corresponding software  
35



1 in the module perform the session opening process. An anonymous  
Diffie-Hellman key generation protocol is used to establish a set  
of session keys (triple DES keys for encryption and MAC'ing) that  
are used during the session. The session keys are not used  
5 directly but instead unique keys, derived from the session keys,  
are used for each successive message.

Once a secure session is established, the user sends the  
scaacLogon command containing the user ID and user password. The  
module uses its access account database to verify the user data  
10 received and to select the role that this user is allowed to  
enter. The user can now send the module any command allowable for  
the selected role. In one embodiment, the module design limits  
each user to a single role and will only allow one user to be  
logged on at a time.

15 Session management provides security services to the  
communications between the host and the module. Session  
management will establish a secure channel between the host  
application and the module application. This channel provides  
authentication and optional confidentiality for the data  
20 exchanged through it. In particular, all command requests and  
responses, except those for opening a session, are protected by  
a MAC. This provides authentication to the command. The host  
and module can verify that it is their counterpart that issued  
the command because no other entity can generate the MAC.  
25 Optionally, the command data can also be encrypted. This  
provides confidentiality to the channel.

All commands from the host are initiated by a user that is  
authorized to execute this command on the module. That is, all  
host-initiated commands require an active user with an  
30 appropriate role (authorized to issue the given command). Except  
for Default role, this implies that a user (with that role)  
should be currently logged on. For all users with roles other  
than Default, the session management is closely tied to user  
logon. A session should be established before the logon and it  
35 lasts while the user is logged on. The session can be terminated

1 after the user logs off. Logon fails if no session is  
established; session termination fails if a user is still logged  
on. Similarly, any module command that requires session security  
(encryption or a MAC) is aborted if this mechanism is not used.

5 An active session is instantiated by active session master  
keys. These keys are exchanged between host and module  
application at session set-up, and they are destroyed at session  
termination. All data transmitted between the host and the  
10 module within a certain session is protected by these session  
master keys. All data is authenticated (by means of a MAC); in  
addition, some data is encrypted to preserve confidentiality.

Preferably, session master keys are not used directly.  
Instead, a temporary key is derived from a session master key for  
each transmission. This transaction key is then used to MAC or  
15 encrypt the transmitted data. The transaction keys are derived  
as a one-way function of the session master keys and a nonce  
(e.g., a transaction sequence counter). This set-up with session  
master keys and derived transaction keys is straightforward, and  
it protects the session master key. The transaction keys are  
20 protected by limiting the amount of ciphertext available for  
attacks. In addition, even if they would be revealed, the use  
of a good one-way function together with nonce for the derivation  
of the transaction keys are sufficient to secure the session  
master key.

25 The Session Master Keys are obtained from an anonymous,  
unauthenticated key exchange. In one embodiment, the key  
exchange protocol is an anonymous (ephemeral-ephemeral) Diffie-  
Hellman protocol executed between the host application and the  
module application. The system parameters (a strong prime  $p$ , and  
30 a generator  $g$ ) are fixed. That is, they are hard-coded into the  
software at both ends. This protocol establishes a shared secret  
that can be used to create a secure channel between the two end  
entities.

Anonymous Diffie-Hellman does not provide authentication of  
35 the end entities or key confirmation. However, the module can

1 implicitly authenticate the host via user logon and application  
data authentication provided from outside of the module.  
Similarly, the host implicitly authenticates the module by  
verifying that it can process the application data. Finally, key  
5 confirmation is achieved at the first exchanged message.

Session Management functions include:

- Session Management Services
  - Open Session
  - Close Session
- 10 • Session Security:
  - Compute Session MAC
  - Verify Session MAC
  - Session Encrypt
  - Session Decrypt

15 Role Access may be accomplished by Command Authentication.  
Because many customers need to be provided rapid access to the  
module, commands from each customer are individually  
authenticated to provide access control. Each customer has a DES  
MAC key (CDSK\_client) and generates a DES MAC for each command  
20 sent to the module. The module uses its copy of CDSK\_client from  
the customer's PSD package to perform the command authentication.  
This meets the requirements for identity-based role  
authentication. Individual command authentication ensures that  
each customer is authorized to enter the customer role and that  
25 the command is an authorized service of the customer role.

The provider role also uses command authentication.  
Provider commands are signed with the key VDSK\_auth. The e-  
commerce server provides the interface to the USPS infrastructure  
and also functions as the provider when interacting with PSD  
30 Packages. When a customer's postal license is approved, the  
provider sends an authorize\_customer command to the module to  
store the licensing zip code and maximum descending register  
value in the customer's PSD Package. Completion of the  
authorize\_customer command places the PSD Package in the *leased*  
35 state, allowing it to begin operating.

1       When the e-commerce server is notified that the customer has  
deposited funds to buy postage, a download postage value command,  
signed by the provider key, VDSK\_auth, is sent to the module.  
The Certificate Authority role is used to load the PSD's public  
5       key certificate. This command (authorize PSD) is authenticated  
when the signature on the certificate provided with the command  
is authenticated by the CA certificate contained in the module.

Some commands from the server to the module do not require  
authentication. These commands are used to prepare a PSD for  
10       operation , to request status from a PSD, or to facilitate system  
operation, for example. None affect data within operating PSD  
packages.

When the server receives a message from the client  
requesting an indicium, it forwards the request to the module  
15       using the create indicium command. Whenever a client's PSD  
package is required to perform a module service, the server  
provides it to the module with the command. The PSD package and  
the client-provided data elements for the indicium are then used  
by the module in the following way.

- 20       1. The indicia signing key token is decrypted and the DES  
MAC key is derived from it. This key is used to verify the  
DES MAC for the package.
2. The PSD state is checked. Preferably, the package  
should be in the leased state for this command to be  
25       executed.
3. The meter number in the command should match the meter  
number in the PSD package.
4. The challenge included in the client message is  
verified.
- 30       5. The key token containing the client secrets is decrypted  
and the DES MAC on the client's request is verified to  
authenticate the client with his PSD package. This also  
authenticates the command into the user role.

After the above checks are completed, the module is assured  
35       of the identity of the client making the request, and is certain

1 that it has a valid PSD package for that client. The module can now perform the requested register modification process.

6. The value of the indicium is then checked to ensure it is within the minimum and maximum limits enforced by the module.

7. The DR is checked to see if it contains sufficient value for the indicium.

If the above tests are successfully completed, the module completes the indicium creation process:

8. The indicium value is subtracted from the DR and added to the AR.

9. The data elements for the indicium are assembled and the indicium signature is generated.

10. The message that will be sent to the client is assembled. In addition to the indicium, this includes the challenge received from the client in the indicium creation request and a new challenge generated by the module that will be returned in the next message from the client. A DES MAC for this message is generated using the client's CDSK\_client key.

11. The PSD package and checkpoint record are updated and DES MAC's are generated for both.

12. The audit log record is then generated.

To broaden the appeal of the IBIP architecture to the small business and enterprise market, one embodiment of the present invention allows multiple employees within a company to access a meter registered to that company as shown in FIG. 8. This embodiment supports such an architecture by leveraging the existing security characteristics of the Postage Server Cryptomodule. In particular, the invention employs identity-based authentication, which is needed to meet the FIPS 140-1 security level 4 requirements. As depicted in FIG. 8, multiple users within an enterprise account are connected via the Internet and a firewall to the Postal server, Postal Transaction server, Provider server, and e-commerce server.

1 In a single user model where there is a direct one-to-one  
mapping from customer to PSD, only a single secret needs to be  
shared between the individual and the cryptographic module. This  
secret allows the PSD to authenticate the communication with the  
5 user. To provide this capability for multiple users, the PSD  
needs to have access to their secrets as well. In this  
embodiment of the present invention, the PSD supports the ability  
to share secrets with multiple users, so that it may perform  
identity-based authentication of these users. To support this  
10 capability, existing services are modified for them to support  
multiple secrets. Preferably no change is necessary to the  
secure protocol the system uses to communicate with the user.

Additional user management capabilities support multiple  
users in a PSD. This is provided through the addition of new  
15 services needed to support the administration of a PSD's  
authorized users. Also, a new role called "customer  
administrator", is added that has the authority to perform the  
new services. This embodiment supports multiple users per PSD,  
supports multiple machines per PSD. In this embodiment,  
20 preferably, all users are within the same license. Preferably  
there is no additional restrictions on a user's capabilities.

In one embodiment, the system of the present invention  
allows multiple individuals to function as a single customer by  
separating the user interface function of the host system from  
the other core functions. An individual interacts with the  
25 machine performing the user interface function, which in turn,  
then communicates with the machine performing the other core  
functions. The machine performing all core functions of the host  
system, excluding the user interface, is called a gateway  
30 machine. This machine acts, on behalf of the individuals, to  
perform all customer functions. Multiple individuals are  
communicating with the gateway from different machines, each of  
which is performing the user interface function of the host  
system. These machines are called interface machines.

35

1        In this embodiment of the present invention, the gateway is  
performing the user authentication function. As such, the  
gateway is responsible for supporting secure communication  
between the customer and its PSD. This means that the gateway  
5 performs the authentication of all messages sent to and received  
from the PSD.

As previously mentioned, the gateway also performs all other  
core functions of the host system (excluding the user interface  
function). Performing these functions at the gateway provides  
10 many benefits due to its centralized nature, including  
consolidated usage logging and simpler configuration management.

A customer entity is responsible for the security of the  
host system used to access the system. In this embodiment, a  
gateway and one or more interface machines embody the host  
15 system. To provide the same level of security as that afforded  
by a single machine model, it is necessary for the communication  
between the interface machines and the gateway to be private and  
tamper-resistant with respect to the community of users accessing  
the host system.

20        When and if the interface machines and the gateway all  
reside on a network private to the user community sharing the  
PSD, typically, no additional security is necessary to protect  
their communication. For example, a corporate LAN is typically  
protected with a firewall that prevents the machines within the  
25 private network from being accessed externally.

In this embodiment, the mechanism by which a customer  
submits a request to purchase postage to the provider  
infrastructure is performed on the gateway machine.  
Additionally, the corresponding purchase approval and download  
30 of postage value to the PSD is performed by the provider  
infrastructure and is preferably unaffected by the introduction  
of the gateway component. FIG. 9 shows multiple users using a  
gateway server to generate secure indicium bitmaps. Users can  
be connected to the gateway system via a private network or using  
35 a secure channel such as SSL if they are using a public network

1 to access the gateway system. Users can print the indicium generated from the gateway system using network printers or local printers that are available. Also, they can use printers connected to the gateway system.

5 In one embodiment, an IBI solution that allows users to use IBI from within a standard web browser tool is used. However, running in the browser environment where the UI and potentially code are delivered dynamically over the Internet brings with it additional security requirements. Improperly designed browser-based IBI systems could allow a number of attacks over the network that are not possible in an application-based system. These include the theft of indicia, substitution of values in indicia (printing something different than the user requested), substitution of values in postage purchases, and the theft of personal information. Generally, printing of indicia can be broken down into the following exemplary steps: entry of values into UI, generation of indicium by PSD, and Printing.

Typically, the security of an IBI system is dependent on the security of the steps above. In an application-based product these steps are either contained within one cryptoboundary or protected by a private, tamper resistant communication mechanism (e.g., SSL). There is a high degree of assurance that what is requested is what is printed and that no one is able to intercept the indicium. A browser plug-in that displays its own native code UI for collecting data for the indicium and prints the indicium itself is shown in FIG. 10. This browser offers the same protections as an application. Untrusted code (e.g., JavaScript) cannot access the data in the UI and transparently modify or steal it.

30 A UI-less (also known as, "headless") browser plug-in that generates and prints indicia with the UI provided by web pages is potentially unsafe. A plug-in installed in this manner is visible to all web pages, not just to pages from the original site. This allows attacks on the first arrow. Input can safely be taken from a web page, but only by providing a way to ensure



1     only authorized pages can create and print indicia. It is  
possible to ensure that the plug-in is being called by an  
authorized web page by having the plug-in check the browser's  
Document Object Model to check to see if the page was delivered  
5     by SSL (to eliminate spoofing) and whether it came from an  
authorized domain (e.g., \*.stamps.com). If both of these are  
true, then the plug-in can trust the web page as its UI because  
the web page has been strongly authenticated to be from an  
authorized source.

10       This can also be accomplished by having the customer's web  
browser connect to a web server (proxy) running within the same  
cryptoboundary, as shown in FIG. 10. Preferably, the proxy only  
allows connections to authorized domains via SSL. In order to  
ensure that the proxy is only receiving requests from authorized  
15     domains, it is necessary for the proxy to authenticate that the  
request came from a page it delivered to the browser. The  
easiest way to accomplish this is to only accept requests over  
the same connection the page was delivered on, but other  
authentication methods are possible. This browser-based design  
20     has generally greater security than application-based designs.

For authentication, each user has a unique user ID and their  
own password. Preferably, user administration may only be  
performed in the cryptographic module. Also, client transactions  
are authenticated to a specific user. For access control, the  
25     system is capable of granting/revoking PSD privileges (e.g.,  
create indicia, reset password, retrieve status, retrieve  
UDSKpsd), and granting/revoking administrative privileges (e.g.,  
add user, delete user, modify user, e.g. privileges, view all  
users). Some account features include account expiration,  
30     password expiration (enforced by client), logon failure count,  
and maximum total postage. Transactions associated with a  
specific user may be audited and administration actions are  
tracked in an audit trail.

Once the audit log record is generated, the server receives  
35     the audit record, the updated database records, and the indicium

1 message to the client from the module. The server stores the  
audit record on the audit file server and sends the PSD package  
and checkpoint record to the database for storage. When the  
server gets confirmation that the database storage operation has  
5 been successful, the message containing the indicium is  
transmitted to the client application.

The create postage correction indicium command performs the  
correction indicia creation function. Preferably, it operates  
identically to the create indicium command except that it results  
10 in a correction indicium being generated.

Because redating indicia creation does not involve the PSD  
postal registers, the module does not perform this function.  
When redating of an indicia is necessary, preferably server  
software performs this function.

15 When a meter is removed from service, the create refund  
indicium command is used to empty the meter's DR. This command,  
which is a service of the provider role, is preferably sent from  
the provider infrastructure and signed with the provider key,  
VDSK\_auth. Preferably, this command can only be performed if the  
20 package is in the leased state or the pwreset state. When the  
module receives this command the result is the creation of an  
indicium equal to the value remaining in the DR. Because  
withdrawal is a special case of a normal indicium creation  
operation, the module preferably performs the same series of  
25 checks as for the create indicium command, the difference being  
the authentication of the provider in place of the customer. As  
a result of this command, the AR is increased by the amount of  
the refund indicium and the DR is reduced to zero. The PSD  
package state is changed to withdrawn which inhibits this meter  
30 from any further use. The indicia data, including a signature  
using the client's private key, is output to the server to allow  
the remaining funds to be credited to the client's account. The  
updated PSD package, checkpoint record, and audit log record, are  
output to the server for storage.

35

1 VBI value download messages are sent from the provider  
infrastructure to the PSD. When a customer deposits funds into  
their account, this triggers the provider's server (the provider  
software) to generate a VBI value download message to the  
5 customer's PSD. This message is a service of the provider role  
and is signed by the provider key, VDSK\_auth. The message  
contains the meter number, control total value (from the last  
successful resetting), and the VBI download value. The module  
performs the following steps.

- 10 1. The provider signature on the message is verified.
2. The PSD package is authenticated by checking its DES  
MAC.
3. The PSD state is checked. Preferably, it should be in  
the leased state or pwreset state.
- 15 4. The meter number in the command must match the meter  
number in the PSD package.
5. The control total in the message must equal the sum of  
the AR and DR from the PSD package.
6. A check is made to ensure that the DR will not exceed a  
predetermined value (in one embodiment, \$500) after the new  
20 VBI is loaded. A check is also made to ensure that the AR  
will not exceed predetermined value after the new VBI is  
spent.
7. If the above tests pass, the module increments the DR by  
the VBI amount contained in the message.
- 25 8. The PSD package and checkpoint record are updated and  
DES MAC's are generated for both. These are output to the  
database server for storage.
9. The audit log record is generated and output to the  
server for storage on the audit file server.
- 30

Audit support provides functions that enable secure logging  
of all (sensitive) actions. The security requirements include  
the authenticity of the entries, completeness, and the inability  
to insert (fraudulent) additional entries. For reasons of  
35 storage space availability, the storage of the entries happens

1 outside the module. Therefore, the security features are built  
into the audit entries themselves. To avoid involvement of the  
originating module (or cloning of the related keys) audit is  
public key based meaning, the audit entries are digitally signed.

5 To address performance concerns, this is implemented as follows.

Instead of signing each individual audit entry, the entries  
are securely chained, and only selected entries in the chain are  
digitally signed. The security of the chaining mechanism then  
makes sure that any previous entries in the chain are implicitly  
10 authenticate as well. This chaining can be achieved by means of  
a hash function: each entry also contains a hash code of the  
previous entry. Modification of any entry in the chain before  
a given one then requires finding a second value that hashes to  
the same hash code. (This is finding a second pre-image for the  
15 used hash function.) That is, the hash code provides a link back  
to the previous entry in the audit chain, and implicitly to the  
entire pre-existent audit chain. This is depicted in FIG. 7.  
In FIG. 7, the arrows between the (identical) hash codes indicate  
the linking back through the chain.

20 The only remaining risk is that the last few entries before  
a crash may be unsigned (and thus forgeable). This risk can be  
mitigated by forcing a signature for certain (more sensitive)  
actions, in addition to forcing a signature on a periodic,  
recurring basis (for example, each 100 entries) as well as for  
25 the first command after a reboot.

All sensitive actions generate an audit entry. Audit entry  
creation functionality are exposed to the module applications  
such that audit entries for all sensitive actions can be created.  
This is the responsibility of each of the functions themselves.  
30 Audit entries are available immediately at completion of the  
sensitive action, to avoid losing audit information due to a  
crash following it. This is done by providing the entry as a  
output parameter of the command itself. Storage is the  
responsibility of the host application. (the SCA layer can  
35 provide the tools to verify authenticity and completeness; given

1 the absence of sufficient storage capabilities within the module,  
there is no way to guarantee availability of audit entries.  
Therefore, this is left to the host application.)

Audit is started at the earliest possible moment, that is,  
5 in the Start Initialization command that effects the exit from  
Uninitialized state. This means that all sensitive actions  
following that event can be audited. During the Start  
Initialization command an Audit Signing Key (DSA) is generated.  
This event, and anything sensitive that follows can be audited  
10 by creating an audit entry.

In one embodiment, an audit entry includes:

- Audit record sequence number
- Hash of the previous audit record
- Identity of software module requesting generation of  
15 the audit record
- Identity of the command requesting generation of the  
audit record
- The user ID (if a user is logged on to the module)
- The user role (if a user is logged on to the module)
- 20 • The current state of the module
- The persistent state of the module
- Date/time stamp
- The reason code
- Data to be stored in the audit record (dependant on  
25 the requesting command)
- Signature (if required by the requesting command)

After the above data elements are prepared for output, a  
SHA-1 hash for the record is computed and is stored in the module  
so that it can be included in the next generated audit record.  
30 An audit entry is chained to the previous entry by the hash of  
the previous entry, as shown in FIG. 7. The chaining is enforced  
by the module by always storing the last hash in persistent  
memory. The register used for this is initialized to all-zero  
(20 bytes) for the first entry.

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1       The chain of audit records begins when the start  
initialization command is sent to a new module. This first  
command to the module generates the DSA audit signing key pair  
(VDSK\_audit and UDSK\_audit) and uses it to sign the first audit  
5 log record. Audit records for commands that affect the module  
(initialize cryptocard, checkpoint commands, etc) are always  
signed. Commands that affect a PSD package are not signed but  
include the hash of the previous record to create a trusted chain  
of audit records between records that are signed. The server  
10 requests a signature on every several records, for example, every  
one hundredth record. The public key for authenticating audit  
record signatures, UDSK\_audit, is extracted from the module using  
the ExportAuditKey command. This command can only be executed  
by the Auditor role.

15       If an audit entry cannot be generated correctly and in its  
entirety, this is considered an error. Since the audit chain  
should not be broken, all data that is correctly obtained is  
returned in the audit entry. In addition, the command that just  
finished execution cannot be undone anymore. Therefore, the  
20 command results are returned to the caller (and eventually, the  
host) only if the error is non-fatal and the output processing  
can be performed (i.e. does not require Session Security  
commands). In general, no additional commands should be executed  
anymore, so the state is set to Error.

25       In case the audit chain is still unbroken, the error is not  
fatal, and may be recoverable through a reboot. (I.e.,  
Persistent state is not set to error.) If the hash chain is  
broken, the audit is permanently damaged (reliability of any  
entries younger than the latest signature before the error is  
30 somewhat questionable). In this case, the error is fatal, and  
both Current and Persistent state are set to Error. This is not  
recoverable, except through a reinitialization of the module.

To avoid continued operation with damaged audit creation  
capability, the first command after a reboot should be audited,  
35 with a forced signature. This ensures that permanently damaged

1     audit creation capability allows the execution of at most one  
       command after rebooting. Since no sensitive functionality can  
       be accessed directly at reboot (e.g., at least a session and a  
       user logon are required), this ensures that no sensitive commands  
 5     can be executed with damaged audit entry creation capabilities.  
       In summary, audit entry creation only leads to command failure  
       if a fatal error is encountered. If the error is non-fatal, an  
       incomplete audit entry is returned for the command. In addition,  
 10    the command's results are returned to the caller if their output  
       processing can be performed (i.e. does not require Session  
       Security commands). Also, audit entry creation set the state to  
       Error in case of failure to deliver a complete entry. This error  
       is fatal (non-recoverable except through re-initialization) in  
       case the linking with the existing audit chain is lost. (This  
 15    occurs only if the previous hash or the sequence number are  
       unavailable.). This is implemented by setting both Current and  
       Persistent state to Error. This error is recoverable through  
       rebooting in all other cases. This is implemented by setting  
       only Current state to Error (Persistent state is not modified).  
 20    The first command after booting should always generate a signed  
       audit entry. This ensures that no sensitive commands are  
       executed if the audit is permanently faulty.

      The Audit Support Commands include:

- Export audit key
- 25    •     Create a new audit key
- Create audit entry. This command has a flag to  
               indicate forcing of signature.
- In addition, the Start Initialization command performs  
               the initialization of the Audit (as well as general  
 30        module initialization) and as such is grouped in the  
               Audit Support module.

      External storage (external to the module) and management of  
       the audit database is entirely up to the host; neither SCA nor  
       SHL can play a role in that. In one embodiment, the postal  
 35    servers store redundant copies of the audit log records on a

1 mirror disk. Storage directly to disk is considered to be more  
reliable than storage on the database server which is accessed  
through the LAN. Storing the audit records separately from the  
PSD package database also protects against all data being lost  
5 if the database should suffer a catastrophic failure.

A proper audit verifies the completeness of the audit chain,  
by verifying all hashes in the chain, starting from the last  
verified signature, and ending at the most recently created  
signature. In addition, all signatures encountered should be  
10 verified. Finally, the hash of the most recently created audit  
entry should be logged (manually) to ensure that replacement of  
the entire chain will be detected. For example, in FIG. 7, if  
Audit Entry 4 were the last entry, one would verify Signature 1,  
Hashes 1 through 4 (establishing that the chain is unbroken) and  
15 Signature 4. (If Audit Entry 2 were signed as well, that  
signature should be verified as well.) The Auditor would then  
log Hash 4 as verified (e.g., written in an audit report) such  
that the next audit can start at Signature 4. (One may still  
want to verify that all earlier entries are present.)

20 Provider software, running on the e-commerce server,  
verifies the integrity of the audit log records at predetermined  
time intervals. First, the chain of records from each module is  
verified by checking all hash values and authenticating the  
necessary signatures. Next, the records from all module can be  
25 combined and sorted by meter number and time to view the history  
of each meter. Because each PSD's AR value is recorded in the  
audit record after each PSD transaction, a database replay  
attack, which would rollback the AR to an earlier value, can be  
detected. If the audit log verification process fails for any  
30 reason, the Security Officer is notified, for example, by e-mail.  
The verification starts at the most recent entry and work back  
towards the entry logged for the previous audit, or the start  
from the entry logged for the previous audit and work forward to  
the most recent entry.

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1           It will be recognized by those skilled in the art that  
various modifications may be made to the illustrated and other  
embodiments of the invention described above, without departing  
5       therefore that the invention is not limited to the particular  
embodiments or arrangements disclosed, but is rather intended to  
cover any changes, adaptations or modifications which are within  
the scope and spirit of the invention as defined by the appended  
claims.

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1 WHAT IS CLAIMED IS:

1. A cryptographic device for securing data on a computer network comprising:

5 a processor programmed to authenticate a plurality of users on the computer network for secure processing of a value bearing item, wherein the processor includes a state machine for determining a state corresponding to availability of one or more commands;

10 a memory for storing security device transaction data for ensuring authenticity of a user, wherein the security device transaction data is related to the one of the plurality of users;

a cryptographic engine for cryptographically protecting data; and

15 an interface for communicating with the computer network.

2. The cryptographic device of claim 1, wherein the state machine includes an uninitialized state.

20 3. The cryptographic device of claim 1, wherein the state machine includes an initialized state.

25 4. The cryptographic device of claim 1, wherein the state machine includes an operational state.

5. The cryptographic device of claim 1, wherein the state machine includes an administrative state.

30 6. The cryptographic device of claim 1, wherein the state machine includes an exporting shares state.

7. The cryptographic device of claim 1, wherein the state machine includes an importing shares state.

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1           8.    The cryptographic device of claim 1, wherein the state machine includes an error state.

5           9.    The cryptographic device of claim 2, wherein the one or more commands corresponding to the uninitialized state includes a command for start initializing.

10          10.   The cryptographic device of claim 3, wherein the one or more commands corresponding to the initialized state includes commands for one or more of get status command, initialize access control database command, logon command, logoff command, query current user role command, query current user ID command, session management commands, audit entry creation command, generate master key set command, and generate transport key pair commands.

15          11.   The cryptographic device of claim 4, wherein the one or more commands corresponding to the operational state include commands for one or more of access control, session management, key management, and audit support.

20          12.   The cryptographic device of claim 11, wherein the commands for access control include one or more of transition to administrative state command, logon command, logoff command, query current user role command, query current user ID command, view access control database command, change password command, set clock command, and set Status command.

25          13.   The cryptographic device of claim 11, wherein the commands for session management include one or more of open session command, close Session command, compute session MAC command, verify session MAC command, session encrypt command, and session decrypt command.

30          14.   The cryptographic device of claim 11, wherein the commands for key management include one or more of export

1 transport public key command, start importing MKS command, create  
MKS shares command, generate MKS command, activate MKS command,  
delete dormant MKS command, global decrypt and MAC command,  
compute MAC command, verify MAC, and encryption and MAC  
5 translation commands.

15. The cryptographic device of claim 11, wherein the  
commands for audit support include one or more of create audit  
entry command, create audit key command, and export audit  
10 verification key command.

16. The cryptographic device of claim 5, wherein the one  
or more commands corresponding to the administrative state  
include commands for one or more of create account command,  
15 delete account command, modify account command, view access  
control database command, end admin. command, logon command,  
logoff command, query current user role command, query current  
user ID command, set clock command, get status command, session  
management commands, and audit entry creation command.

17. The cryptographic device of claim 6, wherein the one  
or more commands corresponding to the exporting shares state  
include commands for one or more of logon command, logoff  
command, query Current User Role command, query current user ID  
25 command, export share command, abort export command, get status  
command, session management commands, and audit entry creation  
command.

18. The cryptographic device of claim 7, wherein the one  
30 or more commands corresponding to the importing shares state  
include commands for one or more of logon command, logoff  
command, query current user role command, query current user ID  
command, export transport public key command, import share  
command, combine shares command, set status command, session  
35 management commands, and audit entry creation command.

1           19. The cryptographic device of claim 8, wherein the one  
or more commands corresponding to the error state include  
commands for one or more of get status command, and access  
control queries command.

5           20. The cryptographic device of claim 1 further comprising  
computer executable code to keep track of a present operational  
state.

10          21. The cryptographic device of claim 1, wherein the  
processor is programmed to verify that the authenticated user is  
authorized to assume a role and perform a corresponding  
operation.

15          22. The cryptographic device of claim 1, wherein the  
cryptographic device includes a computer executable code for  
preventing unauthorized disclosure of data.

20          23. The cryptographic device of claim 1, wherein the  
cryptographic device includes a computer executable code for  
supporting multiple concurrent users and maintaining a separation  
of roles and operations performed by each user.

25          24. The cryptographic device of claim 1, wherein the value  
bearing item is a postage value including a postal indicium.

25          25. The cryptographic device of claim 24, wherein the  
postal indicium comprises a digital signature.

30          26. The cryptographic device of claim 24, wherein the  
postal indicium comprises a postage amount.

35          27. The cryptographic device of claim 24, wherein the  
postal indicium comprises an ascending register of used postage  
and descending register of available postage.

1           28. The cryptographic device of claim 1, wherein the value  
bearing item is a ticket.

5           29. The cryptographic device of claim 1, wherein the value  
bearing item includes a bar code.

          30. The cryptographic device of claim 1, wherein the value  
bearing item is a coupon.

10          31. The cryptographic device of claim 1, wherein the value  
bearing item is currency.

15          32. The cryptographic device of claim 1, wherein the value  
bearing item is a voucher.

          33. The cryptographic device of claim 1, wherein the value  
bearing item is a traveler's check.

20          34. The cryptographic device of claim 1, wherein each  
security device transaction data includes an ascending register  
value, a descending register value, a respective cryptographic  
device ID, an indicium key certificate serial number, a licensing  
ZIP code, a key token for an indicium signing key, user secrets,  
25 a key for encrypting user secrets, data and time of last  
transaction, last challenge received from a respective client  
subsystem, an operational state of the respective device,  
expiration dates for keys, and a passphrase repetition list.

30          35. The cryptographic device of claim 1, wherein each  
security device transaction data includes information to define  
the present operational state of the device.

35          36. The cryptographic device of claim 1, wherein the  
processor is capable of sharing a secret with a plurality of  
other cryptographic devices.

1           37. The cryptographic device of claim 1, wherein the  
processor and the cryptographic engine generate a master key set  
(MKS).

5           38. The cryptographic device of claim 37, wherein the MKS  
includes a Master Encryption Key (MEK) used to encrypt keys when  
stored outside the device.

10           39. The cryptographic device of claim 38, wherein the MKS  
further includes a Master Authentication Key (MAK) used to  
compute a DES MAC for signing keys when stored outside of the  
device.

15           40. The cryptographic device of claim 1, wherein the  
cryptographic engine is programmed to perform one or more of  
Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA) public key encryption, DES,  
Triple-DES, DSA signature, SHA-1, and Pseudo-random number  
generation algorithms.

20           41. The cryptographic device of claim 1, wherein at least  
one of the plurality of users is an enterprise account.

25           42. A method for securing data on a computer network  
including a plurality of users comprising the steps of:

              authenticating the plurality of users for secure  
processing of a value bearing item;

              storing security device transaction data in a memory  
for ensuring authenticity and authority of one of the plurality  
of users, wherein the security device transaction data is related  
30 to the one of the plurality of users; and

              determining a state in a state machine for availability  
of one or more commands.

35           43. The method of claim 42 further comprising the step of  
printing the value bearing item.

1           44. The method of claim 42 further comprising the step of  
storing a plurality of security device transaction data in a  
database wherein, each transaction data is related to one of the  
plurality of users.

5           45. The method of claim 44 further comprising the step of  
loading a security device transaction data related to the  
cryptographic device when the user requests to operate on a value  
bearing item.

10           46. The method of claim 42 further comprising the steps of  
authenticating the identity of each user and verifying that the  
identified user is authorized to assume a role and to perform a  
corresponding operation.

15           47. The method of claim 42, wherein the step of determining  
a state comprises of determining an uninitialized state.

20           48. The method of claim 42, wherein the step of determining  
a state comprises of determining an initialized state.

            49. The method of claim 42, wherein the step of determining  
a state comprises of determining an operational state.

25           50. The method of claim 42, wherein the step of determining  
a state comprises of determining an administrative state.

            51. The method of claim 42, wherein the step of determining  
a state comprises of determining an exporting shares state.

30           52. The method of claim 42, wherein the step of determining  
a state comprises of determining an importing shares state.

            53. The method of claim 42, wherein the step of determining  
35 a state comprises of determining an error state.



1           54. The method of claim 47, wherein the one or more  
commands corresponding to the uninitialized state includes a  
command for start initializing.

5           55. The method of claim 48, wherein the one or more  
commands corresponding to the initialized state includes commands  
for one or more of get status command, initialize access control  
database command, logon command, logoff command, query current  
10 user role command, query current user ID command, session  
management commands, audit entry creation command, generate  
master key set command, and generate transport key pair commands.

15           56. The method of claim 49, wherein the one or more  
commands corresponding to the operational state include commands  
for one or more of access control, session management, key  
management, and audit support.

20           57. The method of claim 56, wherein the commands for access  
control include one or more of transition to administrative state  
command, logon command, logoff command, query current user role  
command, query current user ID command, view access control  
database command, change password command, set clock command, and  
set Status command.

25           58. The method of claim 56, wherein the commands for  
session management include one or more of open session command,  
close Session command, compute session MAC command, verify  
session MAC command, session encrypt command, and session decrypt  
command.

30           59. The method of claim 56, wherein the commands for key  
management include one or more of export transport public key  
command, start importing MKS command, create MKS shares command,  
generate MKS command, activate MKS command, delete dormant MKS  
35

1     command, global decrypt and MAC command, compute MAC command,  
       verify MAC, and encryption and MAC translation commands.

5     60. The method of claim 56, wherein the commands for audit  
       support include one or more of create audit entry command, create  
       audit key command, and export audit verification key command.

10    61. The method of claim 50, wherein the one or more  
       commands corresponding to the administrative state include  
       commands for one or more of create account command, delete  
       account command, modify account command, view access control  
       database command, end admin. command, logon command, logoff  
       command, query current user role command, query current user ID  
       command, set clock command, get status command, session  
       management commands, and audit entry creation command.

20    62. The method of claim 51, wherein the one or more  
       commands corresponding to the exporting shares state include  
       commands for one or more of logon command, logoff command, query  
       Current User Role command, query current user ID command, export  
       share command, abort export command, get status command, session  
       management commands, and audit entry creation command.

25    63. The method of claim 52, wherein the one or more  
       commands corresponding to the importing shares state include  
       commands for one or more of logon command, logoff command, query  
       current user role command, query current user ID command, export  
       transport public key command, import share command, combine  
       shares command, set status command, session management commands,  
       and audit entry creation command.

35    64. The method of claim 53, wherein the one or more  
       commands corresponding to the error state include commands for  
       one or more of get status command, and access control queries  
       command.

1           65. The method of claim 42, further comprising the step of  
printing a postage value including a postal indicium.

5           66. The method of claim 65, wherein the postal indicium  
includes a digital signature.

          67. The method of claim 65, wherein the postal indicium  
includes a postage amount.

10          68. The method of claim 65, wherein the postal indicium  
comprises an ascending register of used postage and descending  
register of available postage.

15          69. The method of claim 42, further comprising the step of  
printing a ticket.

          70. The method of claim 42, further comprising the step of  
printing a bar code.

20          71. The method of claim 42, further comprising the step of  
printing a coupon.

          72. A security system for securing data in a computer  
network comprising:

25           a plurality of user terminals coupled to the computer  
network;

          a cryptographic device remote from the plurality of  
user terminals and coupled to the computer network, wherein the  
cryptographic device includes a state machine for determining a  
30       state corresponding to one or more commands available to an  
authenticated user; and

          a plurality of security device transaction data for  
ensuring authenticity of the one or more users, wherein each  
security device transaction data is related to a user.

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1           73. The system of claim 72, wherein the security device  
transaction data related to a user is loaded into the  
cryptographic device when the user requests to operate on a value  
bearing item.

5           74. The system of claim 72, wherein the state machine  
includes an uninitialized state.

10          75. The system of claim 72, wherein the state machine  
includes an initialized state.

          76. The system of claim 72, wherein the state machine  
includes an operational state.

15          77. The system of claim 72, wherein the state machine  
includes an administrative state.

          78. The system of claim 72, wherein the state machine  
includes an exporting shares state.

20          79. The system of claim 72, wherein the state machine  
includes an importing shares state.

25          80. The system of claim 72, wherein the state machine  
includes an error state.

30          81. The system of claim 74, wherein the one or more  
commands corresponding to the uninitialized state includes a  
command for start initializing.

35          82. The system of claim 75, wherein the one or more  
commands corresponding to the initialized state includes commands  
for one or more of get status command, initialize access control  
database command, logon command, logoff command, query current  
user role command, query current user ID command, session

1 management commands, audit entry creation command, generate  
master key set command, and generate transport key pair commands.

5 83. The system of claim 76, wherein the one or more  
commands corresponding to the operational state include commands  
for one or more of access control, session management, key  
management, and audit support.

10 84. The system of claim 83, wherein the commands for access  
control include one or more of transition to administrative state  
command, logon command, logoff command, query current user role  
command, query current user ID command, view access control  
database command, change password command, set clock command, and  
set Status command.

15 85. The system of claim 83, wherein the commands for  
session management include one or more of open session command,  
close Session command, compute session MAC command, verify  
session MAC command, session encrypt command, and session decrypt  
20 command.

25 86. The system of claim 83, wherein the commands for key  
management include one or more of export transport public key  
command, start importing MKS command, create MKS shares command,  
generate MKS command, activate MKS command, delete dormant MKS  
command, global decrypt and MAC command, compute MAC command,  
verify MAC, and encryption and MAC translation commands.

30 87. The system of claim 83, wherein the commands for audit  
support include one or more of create audit entry command, create  
audit key command, and export audit verification key command.

35 88. The system of claim 77, wherein the one or more  
commands corresponding to the administrative state include  
commands for one or more of create account command, delete

1 account command, modify account command, view access control  
database command, end admin. command, logon command, logoff  
command, query current user role command, query current user ID  
command, set clock command, get status command, session  
5 management commands, and audit entry creation command.

89. The system of claim 78, wherein the one or more  
commands corresponding to the exporting shares state include  
commands for one or more of logon command, logoff command, query  
10 Current User Role command, query current user ID command, export  
share command, abort export command, get status command, session  
management commands, and audit entry creation command.

90. The system of claim 79, wherein the one or more  
15 commands corresponding to the importing shares state include  
commands for one or more of logon command, logoff command, query  
current user role command, query current user ID command, export  
transport public key command, import share command, combine  
shares command, set status command, session management commands,  
20 and audit entry creation command.

91. The system of claim 80, wherein the one or more  
commands corresponding to the error state include commands for  
one or more of get status command, and access control queries  
25 command.

92. The system of claim 72 further comprising computer  
executable code to keep track of a present operational state.

30 93. The system of claim 72, wherein the processor is  
programmed to verify that the authenticated user is authorized  
to assume a role and perform a corresponding operation.

94. The system of claim 72, wherein the system includes a  
35 computer executable code for supporting multiple concurrent users

1 and maintaining a separation of roles and operations performed  
by each user.

5 95. The system of claim 72, wherein the value bearing item  
is a postage value including a postal indicium.

96. The system of claim 95, wherein the postal indicium  
comprises a digital signature.

10 97. The system of claim 95, wherein the postal indicium  
comprises a postage amount.

15 98. The system of claim 95, wherein the postal indicium  
comprises an ascending register of used postage and descending  
register of available postage.

99. The system of claim 72, wherein the value bearing item  
is a ticket.

20 100. The system of claim 72, wherein the value bearing item  
includes a bar code.

25 101. The system of claim 72, wherein each security device  
transaction data includes information to define the present  
operational state of the device.

30 102. The system of claim 72, wherein the cryptographic  
engine is programmed to perform one or more of Rivest, Shamir and  
Adleman (RSA) public key encryption, DES, Triple-DES, DSA  
signature, SHA-1, and Pseudo-random number generation algorithms.

103. The system of claim 72, wherein at least one of the  
users is an enterprise account.

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1           104. A method for secure printing of value-bearing items  
over a computer network having a plurality of user terminals, the  
method comprising the steps of:

              storing information about a plurality of users using  
5   the plurality of terminals in a database remote from the  
plurality of user terminals;

              securing the information about the users in the  
database by one or more of cryptographic devices remote from the  
plurality of user terminals;

10           storing a plurality of security device transaction data  
in the database, wherein each transaction data is related to one  
of the plurality of users; and

              determining a state in a state machine for availability  
of one or more commands.

15           105. The method of claim 104 further comprising the step of  
printing the value bearing item.

              106. The method of claim 104 further comprising the step of  
20   loading a security device transaction data related to a user into  
one of the one or more of cryptographic devices when the user  
requests to operate on a value bearing item.

              107. The method of claim 104 further comprising the step of  
25   loading a security device transaction data related to the  
cryptographic device when the user requests to operate on a value  
bearing item.

              108. The method of claim 104 further comprising the steps  
30   of authenticating the identity of each user and verifying that  
the identified user is authorized to assume a role and to perform  
a corresponding operation.

35



1           109. The method of claim 104, wherein the step of  
determining a state comprises of determining an uninitialized state.

5           110. The method of claim 104, wherein the step of  
determining a state comprises of determining an initialized  
state.

10           111. The method of claim 104, wherein the step of  
determining a state comprises of determining an operational  
state.

15           112. The method of claim 104, wherein the step of  
determining a state comprises of determining an administrative  
state.

20           113. The method of claim 104, wherein the step of  
determining a state comprises of determining an exporting shares  
state.

25           114. The method of claim 104, wherein the step of  
determining a state comprises of determining an importing shares  
state.

30           115. The method of claim 104, wherein the step of  
determining a state comprises of determining an error state.

35           116. The method of claim 104, further comprising the step  
of printing a postage value including a postal indicium.

          117. The method of claim 116, wherein the postal indicium  
includes a digital signature.

          118. The method of claim 116, wherein the postal indicium  
includes a digital signature.

1           119. The method of claim 116, wherein the postal indicium  
includes a postage amount.

5           120. The method of claim 104, further comprising the step  
of printing a ticket.

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1                   CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE FOR SECURE PROCESSING  
                    OF VALUE-BEARING ITEMS

ABSTRACT OF THE DISCLOSURE

5           An on-line value bearing item (VBI) printing system that  
includes one or more cryptographic modules and a central database  
is disclosed. The cryptographic modules are capable of  
implementing the USPS Information Based Indicia Program Postal  
Security Device Performance Criteria and other required VBI  
10 standards. The modules encipher the information stored in the  
central database for all of the on-line VBI system customers and  
are capable of preventing access to the database by unauthorized  
users. Additionally, the cryptographic module is capable of  
preventing unauthorized and undetected modification, including  
15 the unauthorized modification, substitution, insertion, and  
deletion of VBI related data and cryptographically critical  
security parameters.

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FIG. 1






FIG. 3




FIG. 4





FIG. 5









FIG.6


FIG. 7







*FIG. 10*



**DECLARATION AND POWER OF ATTORNEY  
FOR PATENT APPLICATIONS**

PATENT

Docket No. : 40630/RRT/S850

As a below named inventor, I hereby declare that:

My residence, post office address and citizenship are as stated below next to my name.

I believe I am the original, first and sole inventor (if only one name is listed below) or an original, first and joint inventor (if plural names are listed below) of the subject matter which is claimed and for which a patent is sought on the invention entitled CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE FOR SECURE PROCESSING OF VALUE-BEARING ITEMS, the specification of which is attached hereto unless the following is checked:

\_\_\_ was filed on \_\_\_ as United States Application Number or PCT International Application Number \_\_\_ and was amended on \_\_\_ (if applicable).

I hereby state that I have reviewed and understand the contents of the above-identified specification, including the claims, as amended by any amendment referred to above.

I acknowledge the duty to disclose information which is material to patentability as defined in 37 CFR § 1.56.

I hereby claim foreign priority benefits under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or § 365(b) of the foreign application(s) for patent or inventor's certificate, or § 365(a) of any PCT International application which designated at least one country other than the United States, listed below and have also identified below, any foreign application for patent or inventor's certificate, or PCT International application having a filing date before that of the application on which priority is claimed.

Prior Foreign Application(s)

<u>Application Number</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Filing Date (day/month/year)</u>	<u>Priority Claimed</u>
---------------------------	----------------	-------------------------------------	-------------------------

I hereby claim the benefit under 35 U.S.C. § 119(e) of any United States provisional application(s) listed below.

<u>Application Number</u>	<u>Filing Date</u>
60/160,491	October 20, 1999
60/160,503	October 20, 1999
60/160,112	October 18, 1999
60/160,563	October 20, 1999
60/160,041	October 18, 1999
60/193,057	March 29, 2000
60/193,055	March 29, 2000
60/193,056	March 29, 2000

I hereby claim the benefit under 35 U.S.C. § 120 of any United States application(s), or any PCT International application designating the United States, listed below and, insofar as the subject matter of each of the claims of this application is not disclosed in the prior United States or PCT International application in the manner provided by the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112, I acknowledge the duty to disclose information which is material to patentability as defined in 37 CFR § 1.56 which became available between the filing date of the prior application and the national or PCT International filing date of this application:

<u>Application Number</u>	<u>Filing Date</u>	<u>Patented/Pending/Abandoned</u>
---------------------------	--------------------	-----------------------------------

**POWER OF ATTORNEY:** I hereby appoint the following attorneys and agents of the law firm CHRISTIE, PARKER & HALE, LLP to prosecute this application and any international application under the Patent Cooperation Treaty based on it and to transact all business in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office connected

**DECLARATION AND POWER OF ATTORNEY  
FOR PATENT APPLICATIONS**

**Docket No. 40630/RRT/S850**

with either of them in accordance with instructions from the assignee of the entire interest in this application; or from the first or sole inventor named below in the event the application is not assigned; or from \_\_ in the event the power granted herein is for an application filed on behalf of a foreign attorney or agent.

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The authority under this Power of Attorney of each person named above shall automatically terminate and be revoked upon such person ceasing to be a member or associate of or of counsel to that law firm.

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I declare that all statements made herein of my own knowledge are true and that all statements made on information and belief are believed to be true; and further that these statements were made with the knowledge that willful false statements and the like so made are punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both, under Section 1001 of Title 18 of the United States Code and that such willful false statements may jeopardize the validity of the application or any patent issued thereon.

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